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FINDING A FORUM FOR NORTH KOREA
Morse H. Tan*
ABSTRACT
North Korea's gross and systematic violations of human rights violate
international law, including contravention of the treaties that North Korea
itself has ratified (i.e., the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). Never-
theless, a surprising dearth of legal scholarship exists with respect to argua-
bly the worst human rights situation in the world. This Article analyzes
possible tribunals to provide a measure of redress for the victims of these
heinous violations once the international community takes notice.
While contemplating other possibilities, such as the International Crimi-
nal Court and South Korean courts after Korean reunification, this Article
suggests a hybrid tribunal as the most promising forum for trying the al-
leged violations of human rights by the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK). Since the inception of the ICC in July of 2002, which
presently has over 100 signatories, certain shortcomings (notwithstanding
its strengths) have surfaced. With problems such as insufficient staffing,
limited resources, and several jurisdictional hurdles, the ICC may not pro-
vide the best forum-although it may provide a rather good one-for ad-
dressing the egregious behavior of a rogue state like North Korea.
Shortcomings in domestic law, sovereignty issues, and the perception of
foreign influence among an ill-informed populace provide additional bar-
riers to the legitimate working of an international court like the ICC. The
solution, as articulated by this Article, is the composition of a hybrid tribu-
nal that combines aspects of international and domestic courts in an at-
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tempt to increase legitimacy in pursuing justice and to build the capacity of
a renewed domestic system, while providing a workable and less expensive
alternative to other, less effective international justice options. By combin-
ing the knowledge, expertise, and work of both domestic and international
personnel, hybrid tribunals can solve the problems of distance, access to
witnesses and evidence, slow prosecution, and the high cost of the ad hoc
tribunals of the past, while still achieving a comparable level of deterrence.
Hybrids contemplate the concomitant goals of respecting sovereignty, yet
resolving to prosecute criminals in situ for violating universal norms.
A comparative analysis of prior precedents around the world also
strengthens the case this Article makes. With a destroyed infrastructure and
legal system, as well as the lack of a legitimate judiciary, a closer look at the
former Yugoslavia provides insight into a possible Korea of tomorrow, one
that might be recovering from a highly destructive conflict. A hybrid tribu-
nal in Yugoslavia attempted to correct Kosovo's devastated judiciary by
incorporating domestic actors and by aiming to increase legitimacy, de-
crease bias, and enhance capacity. Cambodia, another East Asian country
that suffered under the yoke of oppressive Communist dictators and saw
gross, systematic violations of the human rights of its people, provides an-
other analogous situation. Similar to the apathy regarding North Korea
presently, the international community and the UN focused on Cambodia's
sovereignty, while a farcical trial of the regime's leader provided little re-
dress for the Khmer Rouge's victims. Examples such as these provide the
international community with lessons from antecedent hybrid tribunals re-
garding the most appropriate methods of implementing international
justice.
If the tragic climax of Korea's instability results in another full-blown
war, then international participation in any sort of redress must avoid the
substance and taint of "victor's justice." However, if the Koreas unite
peacefully, producing and utilizing any sort of tribunal so as to avoid an
accusation of imperialism would remain challenging at best. The end
product should be a hybrid tribunal that would ideally combine the
strengths of a domestic court with the contributions of an international
court to enhance legitimacy, build domestic capacity, reduce costs, and help
bring a measure of justice. As a lack of commitment by the international
community has stymied the process of providing justice in many previous
cases, we must stay committed to adequately providing a remedy that the
victims of this rogue state so desperately need.
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I. INTRODUCTIONIN the context of the precedents set in the Nuremberg Trials and To-
kyo Trials after World War II; the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia; the hybrid tribunals concerning places such as
Cambodia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ko-
sovo; and the establishment of the International Criminal Court through
the Rome Treaty, the magnitude, severity, and frequency of human rights
violations in North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of
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Korea (DPRK), calls for the redress that such courts have sought to
bring. This Article analyzes possible judicial redress, suggesting that a
hybrid tribunal might best provide a context to bring a measure of justice
for the North Korean regime's reprehensible trampling of human rights-
especially those of its own populace.'
II. FINDING A FORUM FOR THE CASE
An analysis of the human rights violations in North Korea, such as in
the prior companion article, flows smoothly into a consideration of the
best means to prosecute such violations. According to Professor Milena
Sterio, "The debate regarding the relative value of international, hybrid
and national tribunals mostly centers around theoretical issues, such as
deterrence, retribution, and national reconciliation." 2 Legal scholars are
most concerned with the type of prosecution that would create the
strongest deterrence and impact on future leaders who would likely com-
mit atrocities. 3 In addition, it is important to consider which type of pros-
ecution would not only provide the local population with the strongest
sense of justice, but could also bring healing to a country that has been
ravaged by war so that there is national reconciliation. 4 Sterio cautions
us, however, that the practical problems concerning the type of tribunal
are just as important as the theoretical problems and need to be consid-
ered just as carefully.5 As Sterio puts it, "[t]he decision to resort to a
particular type of prosecution cannot be examined in purely theoretical
terms because practical considerations often dictate a particular
outcome."6
In situations such as North Korea's, the choice of forum would depend
on a range of factors.7 Sterio offers the following asseveration that prose-
cution should follow particularly horrible international crimes:
[C]ertain heinous crimes, such as genocide and crimes against hu-
manity require that offenders be prosecuted in some forum, be it
international or national, and that the prosecution be in accordance
with international law, even if the offender's home country refuses to
prosecute . . .. He should be prosecuted in a forum capable of apply-
ing international law, or at least capable of applying national law that
is in compliance with international law. Thus, such a defendant could
be prosecuted in the ICC [the International Criminal Court], in a
1. In the present Article, I will not go into an extensive analysis of these human rights
violations. Put briefly, with its crimes against humanity, such as extermination, torture,
and crimes of association as well as collective retribution inside and outside its system of
concentration camps, North Korea may very well present the worst human rights situation
in the world. See generally Morse H. Tan, A State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of
North Korea, 80 Miss. L.J. 681 (2010).
2. Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to Prosecute International War Crimes: Pro-





7. Id. at 902.
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hybrid body, such as the Special Court, or in a country other than his
home country capable of conducting a prosecution in accordance
with international law.8
In addition, Sterio raises critical practical considerations of forum se-
lection. 9 According to Sterio, the fundamental question is not only
whether a country has the will and capacity to prosecute a well-known
defendant, but also whether there is practical sense in the country's pros-
ecution of said defendant.' 0 The following factors are necessary for the
determination of whether a national prosecution is warranted:
[T]he geographic location of the evidence and witnesses needed to
testify; the feasibility of a witness protection plan; the competence of
the local judiciary; the existence of a national criminal code in com-
pliance with international law; the presence of an appropriate infra-
structure, as well as the country's physical capability to exercise
jurisdiction over such a defendant."
Jurisdictional issues related to sovereignty also present caveats for any
forum selected for prosecution.12 Theoretical bases for criminal jurisdic-
tion abound for prosecuting an individual who committed the alleged
crimes in his nation of origin where the victims remain, whereas prosecut-
ing the same individual in a neighboring state may prove to be more diffi-
cult or impossible, depending on the crime.13
How national, regional, and international political pressure all interact
together may have a direct impact on how the forum develops as a matter
of practical consideration in working toward human rights justice.14
There are numerous illustrations of this interplay. In the case of Sierra
Leone, the national government worked closely with the United Nations
Security Council to create the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
which specially incorporated domestic law into the proceedings.15 Yet,
8. Id. Sterio continues in stating that any national forum that would prosecute such a
defendant would need have jurisdiction over him, such as universal jurisdiction. Id.
9. See id.
10. Id. at 903.
11. Id.
12. Eric S. Kobrick, Note, The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction over International Crimes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1518 (1987).
13. International law generally recognizes five different types of criminal jurisdiction
over an individual. Territorial jurisdiction is based on where the crime was committed or
where the crime was intended to produce some "detrimental effects within a nation." Id.
at 1519 (providing a summary of the bases for criminal jurisdiction in international law
from federal case law). Nationality jurisdiction arises from the nationality of the alleged
offender, while passive personality jurisdiction stems from the nationality of the crime vic-
tim. Id. Protective jurisdiction entails protecting the interest and integrity of a nation. Id.
Universal jurisdiction, being quite different from the others, only requires physical custody
of an offender and allows for states to prosecute them without any connection of the of-
fender's crime to that state. Id. Consequently, without a connection between the offender
and the prosecuting state, finding universal jurisdiction typically requires the offender to
have committed the most heinous of international crimes. See id. at 1519-24.
14. Sterio, supra note 2, at 904.
15. Id. at 896; STEVEN D. ROPER & LILIAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBU-
NALS: SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
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the South African government formed the South African Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission of South Africa (which was not a court) because
it wanted to retain control over its own justice system.16 The United Na-
tions attempted to negotiate for an "internationally-supported tribunal"
in Burundi but failed due to international objections to implementing
death penalty provisions.17 In Cambodia, the government went back on
its moves to involve international actors when it became clear that mem-
bers of the Khmer Rouge regime, who now occupied positions in the
newly established government, might be tried for their involvement in
atrocities.18 The former Yugoslavia and Rwanda both openly protested
the creation of criminal tribunals, but the proceedings of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were implemented by the
United Nations Security Council.19 The Security Council referred Sudan
to the ICC, despite its opposition to the action. 20
While an overstatement in regards to North Korea, Chambers's point
about the dearth of effective action by the international community has
nonetheless proven largely accurate: "In passing we should realize that
nothing the international community has done so far has had the slightest
effect on North Korea." 21 Interestingly, the international community did
respond to apartheid in South Africa via boycotts and sanctions to bring
about the cessation of apartheid and human rights abuses. 22 Since 1961,
the United States has imposed a severe, although ineffective, economic
boycott on Cuba.23 This poses the question of why the international com-
munity has not given equal attention to the grave human rights abuses in
North Korea. 24
RIGHTS 37-38 (2006). However, this process, along with the temporal jurisdiction of the
Court, was a substantial challenge for the SCSL. See ROPER & BARRIA, supra, at 36-37.
16. Sterio, supra note 2, at 904-05.
17. Id. at 905.
18. Id.
19. Id. For example, the Rwandan government had a number of objections to the
ICTR. It rejected this tribunal because it could not prosecute crimes before 1994, gave no
option for the death penalty (as opposed to the domestic judicial system), punished more
than just genocide, and was located hundreds of miles away in Tanzania. ROPER & BAR-
RIA, supra note 15, at 23-24.
20. Sterio, supra note 2, at 905.
21. Id. at 18. However, North Korea has expressed concern in the past about possible
UN resolutions and actions-so much so that it has threatened war in the event of UN
Security Council moves. These threats have not yet been actualized into action.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Some may claim that China's position may be a major portion of the answer as the
biggest supporter of North Korea. See generally China and North Korea: Comrades For-
ever?, INT'L CRIsIs GROUP (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/asia/
north-east-asia/north-korea/112_china andnorth korea comrades,.forever.pdf (detailing
the high level of economic support and influence China exerts on North Korea). The rela-
tionship between the DPRK and China, however, is complicated, as a number of scholars
have pointed out.
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A. THE NORTH KOREAN SETTING
Although the creation of a proposed tribunal may be purely specula-
tive at this point in time, an attempt to formulate the conditions under
which North Korea may find itself subject to prosecution presents an op-
portunity to hypothesize a tribunal's structure and responsibilities. An
Article such as this cannot escape the question of feasibility and legiti-
macy concerns that engulf the Korean Peninsula presently, especially with
the recent death of Kim Jong-II. In this attempt to portray a possible
setting, three areas must be flushed out: Korean reunification; a physical
setting (location and personnel); and applicable domestic and interna-
tional law.
1. Korean Reunification
Words of reunification have been on the lips of Koreans everywhere
since the armistice agreement and the commencement of the Geneva
Conference of 1954.25 Korea was a unified country prior to its division
against its will along the 38th parallel 26-now the most heavily fortified
border in the world. What is difficult, however, is bringing these same
people together who have diverged dramatically in almost every way over
the last sixty years.27 While one may find it difficult to prognosticate
about what may take place after over a half-century of separation, a
sketch of two general scenarios may help as possible backdrops for a fu-
ture tribunal.
a. Peaceful Unification
The joint declaration and understanding by North and South Korea in
June of 2000 raised hopes for future reunification, a much longed-for out-
come by the people of both Koreas. 28 Since that time, many commenta-
tors have started to outline the possibilities for the reunification of Korea
and put forth their own strategies of how to attempt such a restoration. 29
Although the precise form of such unification remains uncertain, a peace-
ful unification would provide the preferable yet politically precarious
platform for a tribunal addressing the atrocities of North Korea.
The vast majority of commentators and analysts have proposed the
foundation of a feasible unification strategy based on a gradualist ap-
25. See generally Jin Lee, A Millennium Hope for Korea: Lessons from German Unifi-
cation, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 453, 456-462 (2000) (outlining unification efforts from the
1950s to the end of the Millennium).
26. See Morse Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Past Failures and Present Solu-
tions, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 517, 520-22 (2006).
27. Lee, supra note 25, at 505.
28. Id. at 453.
29. See e.g., Cecilia Y. Oh, The Effect of Reunification of North and South Korea on
Treaty Status, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 311, 316-48 (2002) (explaining state succession law
and the effects of unification on Korean treaties); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and
Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 199 (2001) (presenting a compre-




proach.30 It is estimated that a gradual unification of the peninsula as one
Korean state could cut government expenditures in half,31 a factor to take
into account when considering the high cost of international criminal
tribunals. It is even easier to recognize that "[n]o viable nation would
stand quietly while another state absorbed it" so quickly, especially a
rogue nation such as North Korea. 32 Such a gradual, peaceful integration
of the two states could also allow North Korea to slowly integrate with
South Korea's legal and economic structure, 33 an important possibility for
retaining the necessary capital and infrastructure for a hybrid tribunal as
outlined below.
Even peaceful unification, however, comes with additional issues. Dis-
solving North Korea into South Korea could mean new nuclear problems
and a dissolution of the past non-proliferation treaties under the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. 34 Combining
and reconciling each of the nations' constitutions, as well as economic,
employment, and transportation infrastructures, also remains troubling.35
The costs of reunification look staggering even by lower estimates,36 mak-
ing the amount of money and capital needed for a criminal tribunal look
miniscule in comparison.
Until the actual reunification does occur, and depending on which
method brings it to peaceful fruition, it remains difficult to determine
how the post-unification process will impact the creation of this new tri-
bunal. Sufficient political will to redress North Korea's many atrocities
against its own people will prove a critical factor.
b. Violent Unification
If the preferred peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula does not
transpire, the terrible specter of reunification by war broods over the pe-
ninsula. The instigation of such a war would likely emanate from North
Korea.37 Under Kim Jong-II, North Korea built up the fourth largest mil-
itary in the world, including large stockpiles of biological and chemical
weapons as well as up to a dozen nuclear weapons that it could utilize
towards its ultimate objective of reunification through force.38 Such a
full-blown war would likely result in catastrophic consequences. Rough
30. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 25, at 502 ("Ideally, a unification method based on two
state's consensus would be finalized by the result of long negotiations, compromises, and
agreements between the two Koreas.").
31. Oh, supra note 29, at 342 (citing MARTIN HART-LANDSBERG, KOREAN DIVISION,
REUNIFICATION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 158 (1998) (stating that a quick reunification
could cost up to $800 billion over ten years)).
32. Id. at 342-43.
33. Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Participatory Governance in South Korea: Legal
Infrastructure, Economic Development, and Dispute Resolution, 19 PAC. McGEORGE
GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 375, 398-99 (2007).
34. Oh, supra note 29, at 337-48.
35. Lee, supra note 25, at 508-11, 516-20.
36. See Oh, supra note 29, at 342.
37. See Tan, supra note 26, at 520-27.
38. See id.
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estimates put a casualty total at over one million, which would be crip-
pling for any nation involved.39 North Korea's nuclear testing, aggressive
military assaults, and abandonment of the Six Party Talks have exacer-
bated the tensions on the peninsula. 40
The United States may play a significant role in any successful reunifi-
cation in the region.41 The United States' Congress enacted the North
Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, seeking to promote human rights in
North Korea and move toward peaceful reunification. 42 It has remained
a key player in the regional negotiation processes.
Unification through war might present surmountable yet difficult chal-
lenges in establishing a tribunal. Infrastructure, capital (and'human capi-
tal), and other resources could be scant, possibly meaning a heavy
reliance on the United Nations or other international funding. A rela-
tively neutral location outside the war zone-which could be far depend-
ing on the extent of the war-would have to be found and agreed upon.
2. Laying the Foundation
a. Location
Without knowledge of the method of unification employed or the exis-
tence of a legal infrastructure after such unification, it remains specula-
tive to contemplate a particular location for a tribunal. However, based
on the preposterous legal system-if it rightfully deserves such an appel-
lation-that facilitates the systematic human rights abuses currently
found in North Korea,43 only two likely options for a location surface:
South Korea or an external location such as China.
If a peaceful unification emerges for the peninsula, it would be appro-
priate to pursue justice in a Korean courtroom with, of course, Korean
plaintiffs and defendants. While North Koreans might object to the crim-
inal tribunal proceedings taking place south of the 38th Parallel, the
DPRK's substandard judicial system and infrastructure make it more
suitable to limit such procedures to a more modern courtroom in the
South. This conclusion finds its premise not only on the shortcomings of
a legal system plagued by injustice and corrupt politicization in the North,
but also on the better court facilities in terms of more advanced technol-
ogy, infrastructure, and the knowledgeable personnel of the South.44 In
other words, it is likely that the South's facilities would require far less
39. Id. at 525-26.
40. See id. at 518-19.
41. See Albert Suh, First Steps Are Better than None: Distinguishing the Practical from
the Rhetorical in the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, 37 RUTGERs L.J. 585, 599
(2006).
42. Id. at 591-93.
43. See generally Patricia Goedde, Law "of Our Own Style": The Evolution and Chal-
lenges of the North Korean Legal System, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1265 (2004) (presenting a
comprehensive analysis of the corrupt North Korean legal system).
44. See generally Kuk Cho, The Ongoing Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice
System, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 100 (2006) (outlining South Korea's legal system and
highlighting their recent promising legal reforms).
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upgrading, thereby conserving resources for impending prosecution. If
the Supreme Court of South Korea, for example, remains intact, it would
serve as a fitting site for the proposed hybrid tribunal.
On the other hand, a violent unification of the peninsula may eliminate
the possibility of the tribunal taking place in Seoul. With both North Ko-
rea's and South Korea's infrastructure demolished by large-scale war, an
external location would be necessary for a criminal tribunal of this magni-
tude. The decision for the location of a hybrid tribunal should consider
the availability of witnesses, court personnel, judges, and appropriate fa-
cilities. 45 North Korean defendants and the North Korean people in gen-
eral would find locations like Japan and the United States quite
objectionable due to the past colonization by Japan of Korea and the fact
that the United States spearheaded UN efforts against North Korea in
the Korean War. 4 6 A magnanimous choice on behalf of the defendants
might be China, North Korea's closest ally and the host of the Six Party
Talks. China might also be the only forum to which former North Korean
leaders would agree. Although leaders would not necessarily have to
come to an agreement in this respect, especially those leaders who may
be indicted, a more agreeable location would undoubtedly limit the per-
ception of "victor's justice," bias, or other legitimacy concerns. Finally,
China's geographic proximity to Korea via Korea's large northern border
could make it a sensible external venue and would diminish the taint of
victor's justice.
b. Judges, Attorneys, and Court Personnel
Judges, attorneys, and court personnel constitute the sine qua non to
make the proposed tribunal operational. 47 Under a hybrid tribunal sys-
tem, judges, attorneys, and other court personnel emerge from both the
domestic as well as the international contexts. 48 Domestically, former
South Korean judges and prosecutors would be less biased adjudicators
of the human rights violations of North Korean leaders against the North
Korean people. Similarly to the defendant judges who appeared before
the Nuremburg Tribunal in the late 1940s, North Korean judges would
likely participate as either witnesses or defendants. 49 Defense attorneys
could possibly be drawn from among North Korean attorneys who are
not defendants or witnesses. Even if these attorneys were determined to
be unfit for this task, international co-counsel could be assigned to aid
and monitor their work. However, North Korean judges serve as mere
functionaries of the North Korean dictatorship; virtually all are affiliates
45. See John Dermody, Note, Beyond Good Intentions: Can Hybrid Tribunals Work
After Unilateral Intervention?, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 77, 81-82 (2006) (ex-
plaining how hybrid tribunals combine domestic and international court personnel).
46. See Tan, supra note 26, at 521.
47. See Dermody, supra note 45, at 81-82.
48. Id.
49. See Douglas 0. Linder, Journeying Through the Valley of Evil, 71 N.C. L. REv.
1111, 1118 (1993).
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in the. Worker's Party of Korea (WPK), and thus would likely be too bi-
ased to serve as judges. Ideally, excellent judges and attorneys from a
wide array of nations, especially from nations that played no role in a
Korean conflict to enhance the perception of neutrality, would also
emerge from the international community.
3. Applicable Law
With the proposed setting in mind, the question of applicable law sur-
faces. What crimes and serious violations of human rights have been com-
mitted, and how do they correspond with applicable law? The
international community has numerous legal tools to prosecute Kim
Jong-Il's brutal regime in the wake of his very recent demise. One need
turn to nothing more than the international law ratified by North Korea
as well as the norms enunciated in its own domestic constitution.
a. Domestic Law
Although North Korean law as such may not provide the best basis for
addressing the country's own human rights abuses due to massive loop-
holes contained therein, the human rights norms it articulates can provide
a legitimate starting place for constructing a jurisdictional framework for
a hybrid tribunal or international court. The Democratic People's Re-
public of Korea has updated its constitution several times in the past two
decades, the latest amendments coming in 2009.so On its face, the consti-
tution appears to provide the nation's populace with numerous political,
cultural, and social rights. For example, the document states that the
State shall respect and protect the human rights of the people through a
long list of provisions.51 Some of these putative rights of its citizenry in-
clude equality; the right to be elected for office; freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, demonstration, and association; relaxation; travel; free
medical care; and expression of religious beliefs. 52 The amended consti-
tution further provides that the State is to provide the populace with
food, clothing, and housing.53
However, this same constitution allows the dictator and his party to
override all the substantive rights enumerated in the constitution. For
example, Article 100 pronounces the National Defense Commision
(NDC) Chairman (who is now Kim Jong-Il's successor, Kim Jong-Un) the
50. Tan, supra note 1, at 684.
51. Many of these rights were those of the "working people" throughout the 1998
Constitution. 1998 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SOCIALIST CONSTITU-
TION (Sept. 5, 1998) (N. Kor.), available at http://wwwl.korea-np.co.jp/pk/061stissue/98091
708.htm. The latest constitution provides many of these rights in a list in Chapter V. 2009
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION chap. V (Sept. 23,
2009) (N. Kor.), available at http://asiamatters.blogspot.com/2009/10/north-korean-consti-
tution-april-2009.html.
52. 2009 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION
chap. V (Sept. 23, 2009) (N. Kor.), available at http://asiamatters.blogspot.com/2009/10/
north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html.
53. Id. art. 25.
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supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.5 4 With
this position comes the constitutional authority to "[r]escind the decisions
and directives of state organs that run counter to the orders of the chair-
man of the DPRK." 55 To further eliminate the rule of law, The Supreme
People's Authority (the supposed equivalent of a legislature) and the
Cabinet (the supposed equivalent of an executive branch) have the exact
same authority to overturn or repeal whatever measures or laws they so
please.56 The constitution functions as window-dressing to deceive the
outside world that rights actually exist for the people of North Korea.
Notwithstanding its propagandistic purpose, the substantive rights out-
lined above do provide a helpful starting point to hold the DPRK
accountable.
To date, nearly every one of these provisions has been violated either
directly or indirectly. As highlighted in my preceding articles, the North
Korean government has consistently restricted freedom of the press as it
engineers pervasive propaganda and conducts systematic religious perse-
cution, while flaunting public executions and collective retribution.57
Kim Jong-Il's regime further implemented egregious imprisonment meth-
ods for political prisoners with horrific torture methods; cruel and unu-
sual punishment for the most minor "crimes" (typically of a political
nature); and despicable prison and working conditions for those unfortu-
nate enough to find themselves in the array of concentration camps
clandestinely placed throughout the country.58 Not only has the nation
failed its starving masses with its "Food Supply System," it continues to
discriminate against citizens based on political affiliation with other basic
necessities, such as clothing and housing.59 The regime's disturbing prac-
tices extend to refugees and those citizens who have escaped the country;
through an understanding with China, North Korea allows for the repatri-
ation of such refugees only to subject them to intense interrogations, nu-
merous forms of torture, and, many times, death. 6 0
These violations are significant because North Korea's Penal Code pro-
vides for redress for many of these crimes already. For example, the Pe-
nal Code criminalizes forced child labor, torture, and inhuman
treatment.61 It also prohibits actions like kidnapping and trafficking,
which under a 2007 addendum is now punishable by execution. 62 Specifi-
cally, the DPRK's recently amended constitution and latest penal code
54. Id. art. 100.
55. Id. art. 109.
56. Id. art. 116, 125.
57. See generally Tan, supra note 1, at 693-95, 701-04, 707; Tan, supra note 26, at
543-46.
58. See generally Tan, supra note 1, at 697-99, 703-07.
59. See generally id. at 687-88, 695-96.
60. See generally id. at 699-701.
61. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTs PRACTICEs-2010, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF KOREA, 3, 20 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1864
91.pdf.
62. Id. at 2.
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may provide the primary applicable domestic law to subject North Korea
to its claimed standards of human rights.
On the other hand, there is the possibility that, if the two Koreas unite
peacefully and a "clean slate" theory is used to compile a new penal sys-
tem,63 South Korean domestic law could be applied to future prosecu-
tions of North Korean defendants. This possibility would not hinder, but
rather strengthen any case against North Korean leaders because South
Korea recently passed the Act on the Punishment of Crimes under the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (The ICC Statute).64
This Act, which enunciates the punishment of crimes under the Rome
Statute, incorporates major international crimes into South Korea's do-
mestic legal system (e.g., crimes against humanity, war crimes, etc.) and
codifies the concept of universal jurisdiction for these crimes.65 In other
words, any individual on the Korean Peninsula could be prosecuted under
the crimes recognized by the ICC through this domestic law without any
jurisdictional hurdles. 66
b. International Law
Under Article 15 of the newest version of the constitution, the DPRK
was to "champion[ ] the democratic national rights of Koreans overseas
and their rights recognized by international law." 67 From this language
alone it appears that North Korea accepts its obligation to abide by inter-
national law, at least regarding citizens abroad. In addition to this provi-
sion, however, North Korea has signed major conventions and treaties to
reaffirm its supposed commitment to international norms and principles
regarding the human rights of its own citizenry.68 For example, North
Korea is a signatory of four major human rights treaties, all of which
could be utilized to adequately provide a framework for applicable inter-
national law in any future prosecutions: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. 69
Although these major human rights treaties do not specifically provide
for criminal sanctions, their provisions still apply to North Korea's ac-
tions. Under principles of international criminal law, applying interna-
63. See Oh, supra note 29, at 343.
64. See Tae Hyun Choi & Sangkul Kim, Nationalized International Criminal Law:
Genocidal Intent, Command Responsibility, and an Overview of the South Korean Imple-
menting Legislation of the ICC Statute, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 589, 590 (2011).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 2009 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION art.
15 (Sept. 23, 2009) (N. Kor.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/kn00000.html. An
alternative English translation is available at http://asiamatters.blogspot.com/2009/10/
north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html.
68. See Tan, supra note 1, at 686-87.
69. Id. at 686.
2012] 777
SMU LAW REVIEW
tional law concepts and treaties to domestic prosecutions depends on
their integration into a state's domestic legal system through legislation. 70
The DPRK has expressly stated in Articles 15 and 16 of its latest constitu-
tion that it would protect Koreans' rights under international law as well
as "guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of foreigners in its terri-
tory,"71 and has incorporated into its penal code punishments for impor-
tant human rights crimes (e.g., child labor and torture, which the DPRK
has itself violated). 72 There is a clear argument that North Korea has
integrated at least some human rights concepts into its domestic legal sys-
tem. Additionally, South Korea has made similar attempts other than the
ICC Statute given above to integrate human rights concepts under Arti-
cle 6 in its own constitution: "Treaties duly concluded and promulgated
under the constitution and the generally recognized rule of international
law have the same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of Ko-
rea."73 This too is significant because South Korea has also ratified the
four major human rights treaties above,74 which could again play a role in
any prosecutions of North Korean defendants if South Korean law is
utilized.
North Korea's massive campaign to rid the country of political dissent,
censure speech, and subject its citizens to labor camps and cruel punish-
ment clearly violates most of the provisions of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.75 Under Part IV of the agreement, the
nation could be subjected to investigation and other measures by the
Human Rights Committee, which would have the power to prescribe so-
lutions to such violations. 76 Similarly, with North Korea's widespread re-
ligious persecution of Christians; withholding of basic necessities such as
food; and horrendous working conditions for many, it would be violating
a majority of articles under the International Covenant on Economic, So-
70. Dapo Akande, Sources of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD COMPAN-
ION TO INT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41-42 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2009).
71. 2009 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION
(Sept. 23, 2009) art. 15-16 (N. Kor.), available at http://asiamatters.blogspot.com/2009/10/
north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html.
72. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 61, at 3-4, 25-26, 28.
73. 1987 DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOBJ [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (S. Kor.),
available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ks00000_.html.
74. Status of Ratification: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/law/ccpr-ratify.htm; Status of Ratification: International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr-ratify.htm; Status as at: Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en; Status
as at: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src
=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en.
75. See generally International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 1-3, 5-7,
10-13, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Tan, supra note 1, at 697-98, 702-07; Tan, supra
note 26, at 543-46.
76. See generally International Covention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 75,
at 179-84.
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cial and Cultural Rights.77 As with the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, under Part IV of this agreement the country would be subject to
investigation and recommendations from the Economic and Social Coun-
cil. 78 North Korea's brutal treatment of many individuals, use of collec-
tive retribution, and cultural oppression, much of which includes children
and newborns, would violate nearly every article of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, which provides special protections to those under
the age of eighteen. 79 The Committee on the Rights of the Child, under
Part II of the Convention, would likely find it necessary to investigate and
report measures for the redress of these violations to the UN General
Assembly.80 North Korea's horrendous treatment of pregnant women
and allowance of rampant human trafficking between China and Korea,
the vast majority of which includes women and the sex trade, would vio-
late substantial parts of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women.81 Part V of that treaty created the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and
this Committee would have a veritable plethora of violations to report
and recommendations for the UN Secretary-General to consider about
these problems. 82
To humanize these violations and how they transgress international
law, a few stark examples suffice. What about the horror of a family sent
to a concentration camp because their small child scribbled with a crayon
on a portrait of Kim Jong-Il?83 Or the young woman imprisoned, beaten,
and sexually abused for teaching other North Korean citizens a popular
South Korean song?84 Or even the principal of the Pyongyang Light En-
gineering College who was sent to a camp for five years for merely sug-
gesting that students should have more study time instead of more labor
responsibilities?85 These examples not only implicate violations of jus
cogens norms (with the torture and abuse of children and adults alike),
but also implicate violating several articles of the above treaties regarding
77. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1-2,
5-12, 14-15, 19-27, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Tan, supra note 1, at 687-88, 694, 697-99,
701-02.
78. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 77,
at 9-10.
79. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
Tan,supra note 1, at 685, 699, 703; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2, 3,
5-7, 9, 10, 12-17, 19-22, 24-32, 35-37, 39-40.
80. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 79, at 172.
81. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, art. 2, 5-12, 14-16, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Tan, supra note 1, at 699-701,
703-04.
82. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, supra note 81, at 21-22.
83. Tan, supra note 1, at 685.
84. DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG: EXPOSING NORTH KOREA'S PRISON CAMPS
46 (Jennifer Fiore & Debra Liang-Fenton eds., 2003), available at http://www.davidrhawk.
com/HiddenGulag.pdf.
85. N. Korea: Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on E. Asia and the Pac. of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 62 (2002)
(statement of So Lee).
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free expression of adults (e.g., Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights) 8 6 and children (e.g., Article 13 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child).87
As stated above, the press has no freedom to criticize the DPRK's re-
gime and citizens are even required to place a seal on their radios so that
only the government's channels can be accessed; if the seal is broken, the
owners of the radio are then treated as criminals.88 Citizens are only al-
lowed to worship the dictator and all other religions are discouraged or
discriminated against.89 One first-hand account related that eight women
were burned alive for refusing to give up their religious beliefs. 90 Policies
and practices like these easily implicate the above treaties regarding free-
dom of religion and thought (e.g., Articles 18 and 22 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 91 and citizens' rights to "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development" (e.g., Article 1 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 92
As an individual digs deeper into the atrocities happening presently in
North Korea, it becomes clear that such government actions require some
form of redress. As another example, consider a woman being forced to
bury alive her own infants to comply with the DPRK's policy of killing
infants of Chinese ancestry. 93 Or the account of a political prisoner
forced to administer poison to a group of fifty women in a gymnasium for
a summary execution. 94 Or the eyewitness reports that between 150 and
200 individuals who escaped these prisons and camps across the North
are repatriated each week to be beaten, tortured, and killed in the same
prisons.95 These examples again demonstrate North Korea's numerous
treaty and convention violations by ignoring the special rights and protec-
tions of pregnant women (Articles 11 and 12 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), 96 the rights
of child refugees (Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the
86. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 75, at 178.
87. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 79, at 168.
88. Sung-Chul Choi, Human Rights in N. Korea in the Light of Int'l Covenants, in
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 126-27 (Sung-Chul
Choi ed., 1996).
89. See HAWK, supra note 84, at 83.
90. Examining the Plight of Refugees: The Case of N. Korea: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 28 (2002) (statement of Sun-
ok Lee), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/107hrg/86829.pdf.
91. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 75, at 178.
92. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 77,
at 5.
93. HAWK, supra note 84, at 61-62.
94. N. Korea: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pac. and the Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism, Non-
proliferation and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 108th Cong. 111
(2004), available at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/108/93390.pdf.
95. Id. at 101-02.
96. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, supra note 81, at 18-19.
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Child), 97 and the rights of all its citizens to life and liberty (Articles 6 and
9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 98 Unfortu-
nately, these examples merely highlight everyday occurrences in North
Korea and do not come close to constituting an exhaustive list.
Even absent the above conventions signed by North Korea and the
country's constitution, the international community would still have re-
course to customary international law and jus cogens.99 For example, the
preamble of every convention mentioned above includes a sentence or
paragraph that notes that the agreements are in accordance with and rec-
ognize the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 100 Consonant with
the view that such rights under this Declaration are already customary in
international law, this further shows that in signing these agreements
North Korea cannot escape the conclusion that its ratification recognizes
these principles as law and gives substantial evidence of opinio juris.1o1
With its oppressive state action expressed above, North Korea would
again be violating nearly every article of the Declaration.102 Moreover,
this state action would defy established jus cogens (peremptory)
norms.103 The pervasive cruel and unusual punishment methods used on
countless citizens for any number of "offenses" or ideologies would fall
under torture, not to mention that the labor camps likely qualify as insti-
tutions of slavery.104 North Korea's systematic persecution, imprison-
ment, torture, and murder of religious dissidents (most commonly
Christians) and infants of Chinese descent also amount to mass
genocide. 05
Furthermore, North Korea remains open to liability and prosecution
under numerous other international treaties and conventions that it has
signed and later breached. 106 Its creation and stockpiling of biological
97. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 79, at 169.
98. See International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 75, at
174-76.
99. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
supra note 81, at 14; International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 75,
at 173; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 77, at
5; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 79, at 167.
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying sources.
101. For a general discussion regarding opinio juris as an element of customary interna-
tional law, see Jo Lynn Slama, Note, Opinio Juris in Customary International Law, 15
OKLA. CIry U. L. REV. 603 (1990).
102. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948). See, for example, Articles 2-15 and 17-29 of the Declaration.
103. For an interesting discussion on jus cogens as peremptory norms in international
law, see Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L.
491 (2008).
104. Torture in this context is clearly a jus cogens violation as many scholars point out.
See, e.g., Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens
and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 97 (2004).
105. Slavery and genocide are also undoubtedly jus cogens violations. See, e.g., Evan J.
Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Duty of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 343
(2009) ("[S]ome peremptory norms such as the prohibitions against genocide and slavery
are relatively uncontroversial across the international community of states.").
106. See Tan, supra note 26, at 524, 532-33, 552.
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weapons violate Articles 1-4 of the Biological Weapons Convention. 107
Due to North Korea's continued aggression towards South Korea and its
harboring of nuclear weaponry, the DPRK is also violating the Agree-
ment of Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation
between North and South of 1991; the Joint Declaration by South and
North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1992;
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and the 1994 Agreed Framework.10
North Korea consistently and brazenly breaks the applicable treaties,
conventions, and international principles and norms that apply to it. For
example, its judicial system is plainly atrocious, allowing for the infringe-
ment of an individual's due process rights on many different levels, which
collides with general principles of international law.109 As will be dis-
cussed below, many of these problems will be highlighted in our discus-
sion regarding a proper forum and tribunal for redress, but an extensive
discussion involving further violations of international law is beyond the
scope of this particular Article. However, keeping the many sources of
international law in mind that North Korea continues to blatantly defy
helps to erect a plausible arrangement for possible redress.
B. THE ICC
After the intervening period between the Nuremberg and Tokyo war
crimes tribunals and the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, enough countries ratified the Rome Treaty to establish the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), which is the first permanent treaty-
based international criminal court.110
The negotiations for the ICC Statute, which entered into force on July
1, 2002, first began in Rome in 1998.111 Many state parties to the Rome
Statute are home to perpetrators of horrible human rights violations and
could be possible defendants of the ICC.11 2 For example, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, and all former Yugoslav republics are state parties. 13
As of April 27, 2012, 118 countries, including Canada and a number of
western European countries, 114 have ratified the Rome Treaty, while
eight have acceded, one has accepted, and one has even seceded.115
However, even those countries that have not ratified the Rome Treaty,
107. Id. at 524-25; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
art. 1-4, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 585, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
108. See generally Tan, supra note 26, at 531-33, 552.
109. See Tan, supra note 1, at 686.




114. ICC at a Glance, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-opi.int/menus/About+the
+Court/ICC+at+a+glance (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
115. Rome Statute of the Int'l Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XVIII-10&chap-
ter=18&lang=en (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
782 [Vol. 65
Finding a Forum for North Korea
like North Korea, may find themselves within the reach of the ICC.116
For example, Omar al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, has been indicted
by the ICC despite Sudan's refusal to ratify the Rome Treaty.' 17
1. Advantages
a. International Resonance
Notwithstanding a country's willingness to engage in domestic prosecu-
tion, ICC prosecution can carry the advantage of an enhanced deterrent
effect internationally. 18 Prosecuting cases in the ICC is especially impor-
tant when it is necessary to send a strong message to the rest of the world
that certain types of behaviors "will not be condoned and the interna-
tional community will act to stop such behavior." 1 9 This is particularly
important when the cases pertain to heinous behavior by well-known of-
fenders, or when the cases involve countries such as Sudan or North Ko-
rea where there are well-documented instances of terrible human rights
violations.120 Therefore, Professor Sterio has argued that prosecution at
the ICC would result in a greater deterrent effect than prosecution in
other tribunals.121
Professor Grace Kang wrote the definitive legal academic article on the
hypothetical ICC case against the now-deceased Kim Jong-II.122 In this
article, she systematically and persuasively analyzed North Korean viola-
tions within the categorical rubric pertaining to the ICC.123 However, the
case for the prosecution of Kim Jong-II in the ICC would have faced the
considerable difficulty of his extradition. Similarly, an attempt to extra-
dite Kim Jong-Il's successor and son, Kim Jong-Un, might ignite another
Korean conflagration.
2. Disadvantages
The ICC has limitations too:
[T]he ICC cannot handle more than a tiny percentage of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity cases as it faces many
problems, including lack of necessary budget and staff, jurisdictional
hurdles, and lack of political support from powerful countries such as
the United States.124
116. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transnational Justice: A Pluralistic
Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 45-46 (2010).
117. Id.




122. See generally Grace M. Kang, A Case for the Prosecution of Kim long II for Crimes
Against Humanity, Genocide, and War Crimes, 38 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 51 (2006).
123. Id.
124. Sterio, supra note 2, at 895-96. The United States has not ratified the Rome Stat-
ute, has been an outspoken opponent of the ICC, and has preferred regional tribunals like
that of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Id. at 896.
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In fact, the United States has been quite outspoken about its prefer-
ence for regional, country-specific tribunals, such as the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. 125 In addition, the ICC has faced and still faces problems
such as insufficient staffing, budgetary deficiencies, and jurisdictional hur-
dles.126 Consequently, the ICC can generally only prosecute a few of the
top indicted individuals, which remains a serious limitation for the
court. 12 7 The limited resources of the ICC might not stretch to cover
North Korean atrocities, although a strong case can be made that it merits
a place of priority among possible choices for ICC prosecution. The au-
thor made this case to ICC prosecutors.128 Shortly thereafter, the ICC
opened an investigation of North Korea.129 It remains to be seen,
though, how far this investigation will proceed.
In part because of such limited resources, the ICC's principle of com-
plementarity articulates the ICC's support of domestic primacy as well as
its role in bolstering domestic law and legal systems:
The design of the ICC, with the principle of complementarity as a
key feature, recognizes that member states have the primary right
and responsibility to prosecute crimes that fall under their jurisdic-
tion, whether typical national offenses or grave violations of interna-
tional criminal law. The hope was that the ICC would be "a catalyst
for beefing up local systems to meet minimal international stan-
dards." The ICC would also strengthen international law generally
by encouraging states to implement their ICC obligations through
domestic legislation. Indeed, "a major success for the Court and the
international community as a whole" would be a system where na-
tional institutions would respond so effectively so as to "obviate the
need for trials before the ICC" altogether.130
Unfortunately, the world persists in a condition far removed from obviat-
ing the ICC.
The complementarity principle of the ICC could be invoked regarding
North Korea if South Korea has sufficient means and abilities to provide
the platform for North Korean prosecution. However, South Korea may
not have the capacity to carry out the prosecution of North Korean
human rights violators if North Korea attacked and devastated it.
As alluded to above, there is also the issue of bias or perceived bias if
South Korean judges and prosecutors engage in the prosecution. This
issue could tilt in either direction: for or against North Korean defend-
125. Id. at 896.
126. Id. at 895-96.
127. Id. at 903-04.
128. Morse Tan, Address at the American Soc'y of Int'l Law Mid-Year Meeting, in
Miami, Fla. (Nov. 11-13, 2010).
129. Interview with Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Mar. 23-26, 2011).
130. Tanaz Moghadam, Comment, Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons from
Hybrid Tribunals Applied to the Case of Hissene Habre, 39 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV.
471, 515-17 (2008) (quoting OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIM. CT., INFORMAL
EXPERT PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 3 (2003)).
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ants. Sympathetic judges who identify strongly with North Koreans as
fellow Koreans might be inclined towards North Korean defendants.
South Korean judges with memories of the Korean War and related hos-
tilities might be all too eager to convict North Korean defendants.
In this respect, the participation of international judges and attorneys
could help defuse either actual or perceived bias. Although such interna-
tional participants may bring biases of their own, there is at least a higher
probability of impartiality given their comparative lack of involvement
with the Korean peninsula, unlike its domestic participants.
a. Lack of Legitimacy
Additional criticisms have been leveled at the ICC, notwithstanding
the important place it holds in the world.13 1 The major criticisms have
been that the ICC is limited in its jurisdiction, and as it is removed from
the situs of the violations, it is also unable to develop local legal facili-
ties. 132 Moreover, the ICC has the severe temporal restriction that it can-
not address any violations that occurred before 2002.133
Each of these criticisms may be contemplated with respect to North
Korea. While a case may have been made for the ICC's jurisdiction over
Kim Jong-II, it would have been difficult at best to extradite him. At-
tempting to extradite Kim Jong-Un at this point would likely be consid-
ered premature. It is hard to imagine the ICC contributing greatly to the
development of local legal capacity in Korea, and it is manifestly distant
from the location of the transgressions. Finally, many of North Korea's
gross, systematic violations took place prior to 2002, a period that the
ICC cannot adjudicate.134
b. Domestic Challenges
Domestic prosecution presents another option. However, several com-
plications may hinder efforts along this route. As one commentator put
it, "[L]imitations on the structure and legitimacy of the domestic systems
often preclude any transitional justice efforts."135 Many times, a recent
conflict destroys the physical and legal infrastructure of the nation, in-
cluding the personnel needed for legal proceedings. 3 6 The nation may
even lack applicable domestic law or experience to prosecute such "egre-
gious offenses" regardless of any legal infrastructure. 13 7 This legal system
may also lack any legitimacy:
The legitimacy of the domestic legal system is vital to any attempt at
accountability, but may be absent either because it was employed as
131. See generally Dermody, supra note 45, at 81.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally Tan, supra note 1, at 693-707.





a mechanism for repression or because its personnel were complicit
in the offenses committed. Transitional justice inherently implicates
divisive political interests. Left to its own devices, a domestic legal
system may not have the impetus to undertake such a daunting task.
The temptation to forgive and forget, an often counter-productive
strategy, is particularly strong when a widespread portion of the soci-
ety was complicit in the atrocities.138
Allowing domestic prosecution also opens the door for a nation to pur-
posely downplay its prosecutorial powers and limit its purported capabil-
ity to address atrocities within its own ranks; this was the case in the
Indonesian Human Rights Courts. 139
Applying these considerations, another Korean war would likely oblit-
erate the physical infrastructure of the legal system and possibly take the
lives of too many civilian members of the legal profession.140 If enough
survive, there would be a core of attorneys and judges who may ade-
quately try the alleged violations. How to handle the North Korean issue
has proven divisive in South Korea because of the efficacy of North Ko-
rean propaganda in South Korea, the South Korean media's neglect in
reporting on North Korea's human rights violations, a common ethnic
identity, and partisan politics in South Korea.141 A portion of the South
Korean populace would likely try to condone or ignore North Korean
atrocities.142 All of these factors could militate against domestic
proceedings.
i. Institutional Void
North Korean domestic institutions, such as its judiciary, leave much to
be desired in terms of political independence, the rule of law, due pro-
cess, and many other concerns.143 In a future unified Korea, the legiti-
macy of the former South Korean institutions, such as the courts, would
be stronger. Dickinson argues that even though the legitimacy of domes-
tic institutions is often questionable in a post-conflict situation, the "pre-
cise nature of the legitimacy crisis varies and is inseparable from the
unique history and culture of a given society."1 44 Dickinson is also con-
cerned that the judiciary would not only have suffered damage to its
physical infrastructure, but also that the available personnel would be se-
verely compromised:
138. Id.
139. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 52. For example, the Attorney General of
Indonesia argued that he could not prosecute crimes against humanity because these
crimes were not found in the domestic legal system and in turn severely limited his own
human rights investigations. Id.
140. See generally Tan, supra note 26, at 525-27.
141. See id. at 543-46.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Goedde, supra note 43, at 1287-88 ("The current predicament concerns
the creation of a viable legal regime for foreign investors, one that is reliable, fair, and
transparent, without intrusive State involvement.").
144. Laura Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International
Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1059, 1064-65 (2003).
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Judges and prosecutors from the prior regime-who failed to prose-
cute or convict murderers, torturers, or ethnic cleansers-may re-
main in place, or alternatively, the new regime may have replaced
the old personnel almost completely, resulting in an enormous skills
and experience deficit, as well as the danger of show trials and overly
zealous prosecution for past crimes. 145
In the instance of Korea, South Korean legal personnel would not have
the problem of association with the prior regime. The dramatic diver-
gence and resulting contrast between South Korea and North Korea
should clearly disassociate the two Koreas in most regards. The concern
about show trials and overly zealous prosecution may still exist, but
neither is an insurmountable problem. Nonetheless, these concerns
would yet remain in a solely domestic process.
c. International Challenges
Another potential problem is that international courts may appear to
be foreign impositions to the local populace. 146 Like the problem of a
body's immune system rejecting an organ transplant, a foreign court may
find that it is subject to a sense that it is "other," and therefore faces
rejection on these grounds. As Dickinson states: "[I]nternational courts
such as the ICTY do face greater obstacles in establishing local legitimacy
in the places from which the accused perpetrators come than they do in
establishing legitimacy within broader international communities." 14 7
If the self-interested machinations of powerful states use human rights
as a mere pretext, then they are inherently deficient in meriting the man-
tle of legitimacy. As Dermody explains:
[H]umanitarian intervention carries with it the fear that powerful
states will use the language of human rights to justify actions moti-
vated primarily by self-interest. . . . Despite the normative value of
humanitarian intervention, the increased prevalence of human rights
in international relations ensures that unilateral interventions will in-
clude the rhetoric of human rights even in actions motivated solely
by narrow state interests. The recent interventions in Kosovo, Af-
ghanistan and Iraq demonstrate'that unilateral intervention is likely
motivated by some combination of humanitarian and strategic
interests. 148
145. Id. at 1065.
146. Id. at 1067.
147. Id. at 1068. The government of Rwanda actually rejected the creation of the ICTR
for several reasons, one of which was the distant location of the tribunal in Arusha,
Tanzania; the Rwandan government claimed that this distant location would contribute to
the loss of the tribunal's deterrent effect on the local populace. ROPER & BARRIA, supra
note 15, at 23-24.
148. Dermody, supra note 45, at 79.
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i. Jurisdiction Without Consent
Professor Diane Orentlicher states: "U.S. officials and other critics of
the ICC assert that the Rome Statute violates basic tenets of international
law regarding state sovereignty by allowing an international court to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over nationals of states that have not adhered to the
court's statute." 149 Not only do critics feel that the ICC lacks democratic
legitimacy in this way, they contend that the ICC does not maintain the
checks and balances that are found in democratic states.150 Further,
many think "that ICC judges will engage in expansive lawmaking from
the bench by necessity [since] international crimes are defined with less
precision than most national crimes." 15 This problem is furthered by the
fact that the tribunals created prior to the ICC were established under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter through the UN Security Council and
were held to have authority to try defendants. 152
Some scholars have also argued that the hybrid tribunals of Sierra Le-
one, Cambodia, and East Timor established just prior to the ICC "re-
present[ed] an attempt by states to reinsert themselves into the post-
conflict legal process and reassert their sovereignty."1 5 3 On the other
hand, it can be argued that the crimes pertaining to the ICC and other
international courts frequently fall within jus cogens norms, which can be
used to implement universal jurisdiction over many defendants and there-
fore such courts do not require any assent to apply.154 A recent empirical
study of the perceptions of the ICTY within Bosnia and Herzegovina pro-
vides an applicable analogy to the ICC.1 55 The study showed that "a wide
cross-section of lawyers and judges from all ethnic groups ... were ... ill-
informed" regarding the efforts of the ICTY and were actually suspicious
of the court's motive and results. 156 The reasons for this lack of trust and
legitimacy may have involved a variety of factors, including:
[T]he location of the tribunal in the Netherlands, far from the local
population, the failure of the ICTY to publicize its work within Bos-
nia, particularly within the legal community, the lack of participation
of local actors, even as observers, and the use of predominantly com-
mon-law approaches to criminal justice that were unfamiliar to local
149. Diane Orentlicher, Judging Global Justice: Assessing the International Criminal
Court, 21 Wis. INT'L L.J. 495, 509 (2003).
150. Id. at 510-11.
151. Id. at 511.
152. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 25. The Tadic case was the first trial under
the ICTY and expressly held "that the ICTY's establishment under Chapter VII was legal
and . . . had the legal authority to try defendants." Id. However, acquiring defendants
from neighboring countries remains a challenge for hybrid tribunals like the SCSL. Id. at
41.
153. Id. at 30.
154. See Moghadam, supra note 130, at 477 ("Universal jurisdiction now covers the
narrow range of jus cogens crimes that are at the core of customary international law, such
as torture, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity." (Latin words in plain text
in original)).
155. Dickinson, supra note 144, at 1067.
156. Id.
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legal professionals, trained in a civil law tradition. 15 7
The ICC and other international courts are often located far away from
the countries involved in their cases, do not involve local actors, and must
overcome suspicions about their work.15 8
d. Capacity Building
Dickinson asserts that: "Purely domestic and purely international insti-
tutions also often fail to promote local capacity-building. In post-conflict
situations, the need to develop local capacity in the justice sector is often
an urgent problem." 159 Such a problem would rise to acute levels if the
country experienced the devastation of war. In Korea, a peaceful reunifi-
cation would greatly diminish the need for local capacity building due to
the existing capacity, especially in the former South Korea. Even in a
peaceful reunification, however, a large infusion of capacity building
would be needed in the North to lay the groundwork for a successful
transitional justice system.
i. Short-Term Measures
International courts, such as the ICTY, can have limited effects of brief
duration: "For example, the efficacy of the Yugoslavia war crimes tribu-
nal has frequently been called into question on the ground that the court
has had little discernible impact on public attitudes in the former Yugo-
slavia relating to war crimes."o6 0 While such an assessment only looks at
one aspect of effectiveness, it does raise particular concerns with interna-
tional courts' lack of impact on public attitudes. In fairness to the ICTY,
longer-term effects may germinate and blossom over time.
This concern materialized with respect to the Nuremberg trials as well
as those of the ICTY. The impact of the Nuremberg trials was not seen
on the German public until almost a generation later, when Germany
began to prosecute Nazi criminals on its initiative in the 1960s. 1 6 1 It is
just as likely that many citizens of the former Yugoslavia will initially re-
sist the "ICTY's lessons in individual responsibility," but the passage of
time might bring about a different opinion.162 Already there is some evi-
dence that the public in Serbia was influenced by the Slobodan Milosevic
trial.1 6 3 Bogdan Ivanisevic, a Serbian staff member of Human Rights
Watch, made the following observation one year after the trial of
Milosevic began:
Even though they have resistance to hearing non-Serb witnesses,
people do take into consideration what they hear. The trial has
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1068.
160. Orentlicher, supra note 149, at 501.
161. Id. at 502.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 502-03.
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caused reduced myth-making in Serbia. You don't hear, as you did
prior to the trial, . . . that [the massacre at] Srebrenica didn't happen
or that the Muslims killed themselves. I wouldn't minimize this re-
duced space for rewriting history. As for acknowledgment of our
side's crimes, it's a psychological barrier too difficult [to cross] that
the policy we supported was criminal. It will take time. It may take
a new generation that was not implicated. 16 4
Decreasing the amount of revisionist history, as modest as this gain
may seem, represents progress in a positive direction that can grow and
mature over time. Reversing and ameliorating the effects of the totalitar-
ian society in North Korea will also take time-such grievous wounds do
not heal overnight. An appropriate tribunal can take some important
steps in that direction that can substantially boost the process. As an
Asian proverb attributed to Lao Tzu states, "A journey of a thousand
miles begins with a single step."1 6 5
3. Adverse Impacts
a. Prosecution Interferes with Peace
There is also a concern that prosecutions are an obstacle to peace. 166
Proponents of punishment do not take into account that "[1]eaders with
blood on their hands may cling more tenaciously to power if they cannot
secure an airtight amnesty." 1 6 7 Instead of promoting reconciliation, pros-
ecutions might incite further grievances-or so the objection runs.168
With respect to North Korea, such prosecutions would have a higher
likelihood of taking place after Korea becomes reunited. Raising the
prospect of prosecution post reunification in official interactions would
decrease the danger embedded in this objection. Whether raised with the
leadership of North Korea or not, such a fear of prosecution may already
exist due to other prosecutions around the world. Also, given that North
Korea already has designs upon reunifying the peninsula by force and has
already engaged in various types of belligerent behavior, it would be all
too facile to scapegoat a possible tribunal for hostile actions that North
Korea would have committed in any case. 1 6 9
In another vein, greater justice deepens a more full-orbed peace. Ig-
noring issues of justice cheapens the blood of those who have already
experienced extreme violence at the hands of North Korean despotism.
For victims of such horrendous suffering, it is the totalitarian regime that
has already been anything but peaceful. 17 0 The difficulties and possible
peril involved in a tribunal do not mean that it should not be attempted.
164. Id.
165. Lao Tzu Quotes, THINKExiST.com, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/the-journey
of a thousand miles begins-withone/214527.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
166. Orentlicher, supra note 149, at 500.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Tan, supra note 26, at 527.
170. Tan, supra note 1, at 704-07.
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At the same time, the specifics of what, when, where, and how call for
careful wisdom.
4. Hard Lessons from History
a. Kosovo Case
i. First Attempt-Under UN Management
Another instance from which lessons may be drawn for North Korea is
the extreme case of Kosovo. The mass atrocities committed in Kosovo
did not leave any fully-functioning domestic institutions standing after the
conflict ended. 171 It was this dearth of domestic institutions that led the
international community and large segments of the local population "to
establish an interim transitional administration, run by the United Na-
tions."172 Its purpose "was to restore peace and stability and to develop
the democratic institutions, including a fully-functioning judiciary, neces-
sary to pave the way for self-governance."1 73 When there is no function-
ing court system and no other political institution with the capacity or will
to establish this kind of system, it is extremely difficult to legitimize insti-
tutions.174 "Moreover, if the lack of formal institutional legitimacy is dif-
ficult to confer on a fledgling justice system, the establishment of
informal legitimacy-broad societal acceptance of institutions-is even
more difficult to establish."175
The conflict in Kosovo severely damaged more than the physical infra-
structure of the legal system.' 76 The legitimacy of the system was also in
question because it bore the taint of the former oppressive regime.177
The legal system did not have the confidence of the public, partly due to
the prior systematic exclusion of the ethnic Albanians by the Serbs, who
were the former administrators of the justice system.178 Not only were
court buildings, prisons, and equipment destroyed, the need for human
resources was immense.179 This is because:
In Kosovo, only Serbs had the experience and training to work as
judges and prosecutors, yet these Serbs often refused to work in the
new system because doing so would constitute a betrayal of their
ethnic heritage. Albanians had some training but little experience,
as they had been excluded from the system for many years. 80
With respect to North Korea, the similarities with Kosovo would vary
depending on the conditions on the Korean peninsula when such a tribu-
nal might be attempted. Another Korean war could wreak mass destruc-












tion on not just the physical infrastructure,' 81 but could also decimate
judges and attorneys in South Korea, who would be the best prospects
domestically for stepping into a tribunal regarding North Korea. 182
North Korea has threatened before to turn Seoul, which is located not far
from the 38th Parallel, into a "sea of fire" or lake of fire,'83 and has the
military means to do so;184 thus, the possibility of widespread destruction
presents itself as a valid concern.
On the other hand, if the two Koreas reunite peacefully, the physical
infrastructure and members of the legal profession would remain. In
such an instance, a united Korea would have much more ample resources
to hold a tribunal.185 However, it is uncertain whether sufficient political
will to have such a tribunal would exist. A peacefully united Korea may
not require as much international support, and it is conceivable that a
substantial portion of such legal proceedings could move forward domes-
tically. Choice of law and domestic fora for such proceedings would
prove challenging to resolve. If the tribunal utilized international law, it
would likely require more international support and involvement.
ii. Second Attempt-A Hybrid Tribunal
Bias and legitimacy remain important problems to consider in creating
a tribunal.186 Sometimes local systems carry so much "baggage" of bias
and illegitimacy that more international involvement can help to relieve
this baggage of the domestic system. Turning again to Kosovo, there is
evidence that the establishment of a new local system and the over-cor-
rection of the imbalances create new problems instead of solving old
ones.' 87 For instance,
it was initially easier to appoint ethnic Albanian judges than ethnic
Serb judges. Only a few Serb judges were willing to serve, and even
those who were appointed subsequently stepped down, in response
to pressure from Belgrade. Yet without representation of Serbs
within the judiciary, the independence of the decision-making, key to
legitimacy among the entire local population, was severely in ques-
tion. . . . Under these circumstances, there was little ability for the
local justice system to deliver verdicts perceived to be legitimate in
trials of those suspected of committing mass atrocities.'88
As discussed above, North Korean judges would similarly be suscepti-
181. See generally Tan, supra note 26, at 525-27.
182. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
183. Paul Richter, Two-War Strategy Faces Test, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2003), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2003/Feb/13/World/fg-twowarl3; Tan, supra note 26, at 526.
184. Tan, supra note 26, at 527-28.
185. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
186. See Dickinson, supra note 144, at 1066-67.
187. Id. at 1066.
188. Id. "In fact, due to concerns about lack of due process and insufficient evidence,
several judgments imposed against Serb defendants by panels of ethnic Albanian judges
were later thrown out by panels that included international judges." Id.
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ble to claims of illegitimacy and bias.189 Given the already-existing lack
of judicial independence from political control, judges in North Korea
should be disqualified from judging. 190 As members of the few in North
Korea who have reaped benefits from the regime, their potential biases
also disqualify them.
In this type of situation involving an atmosphere of domestic bias and
illegitimacy, hybrid tribunals, as Kosovo has shown, can prove to be help-
ful alternatives to either purely domestic or purely international courts by
increasing legitimacy, decreasing bias, and enhancing capacity.191 "The
sharing of responsibilities among international and local actors in the ad-
ministration of justice, particularly with respect to accountability for seri-
ous human rights crimes, helps to establish the legitimacy of the process
as well as strengthen the capacity of local actors." 192 Such amelioration
in regards to impartiality, legitimacy, and expertise enhanced matters in
Kosovo and can potentially aid in bringing a measure of justice to the
people of North Korea.193 In Korea, however, there would likely be pro-
nounced sensitivity towards anything that smacked of foreign imperial-
ism. Additionally, a hybrid tribunal must try to save the face of Koreans
as much as possible throughout such a process. Such considerations
would be critical to the success of a hybrid tribunal in North Korea.
Furthermore, it would be best if there was a broad international effort
rather than, for example, an exclusively American one.194 A solely
American effort would play into the propaganda of North Korea regard-
ing American "imperialism" on the peninsula.
b. Cambodian Case
From a historical perspective, Cambodia provides an appropriate anal-
ogy to North Korea in a number of ways. Both have been Communist
regimes under oppressive dictators; both have taken place in Asia; and
both have resorted to gross, systematic violations of human rights of their
own people. Contemplating the Cambodian experience can provide les-
sons applicable to North Korea.
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), commonly known as the
Khmer Rouge (KR), took control of Cambodia in 1975 and remained in
power until Vietnamese forces drove most of the regime to the
Cambodian-Thai border and largely out of power.195 Under the leader-
ship of Pol Pot, the KR "strove to build a socially and ethnically homoge-
neous society by abolishing all preexisting economic, social, and cultural
189. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
190. See, e.g., Goedde, supra note 43, at 1271-72 (explaining how state coercion in the
"rule of law" is legitimized in North Korea and other socialist countries).
191. See Dickinson, supra note 144, at 1068-69.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1068-69.
194. See generally Tan, supra note 26, at 547-53.
195. Brian Tittemore, Khmer Rouge Crimes: The Elusive Search for Justice, 7 Hum.
RTS. BRIEF 3, 3 (1999).
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institutions, and transforming the population of Cambodia into a collec-
tive workforce." 196 In the process, the regime displaced millions of
Cambodians by subjecting them "to forced labor and inhumane living
conditions, including physical exhaustion, starvation, and disease."197 In
an effort to "purge perceived ideological enemies" throughout the coun-
try, the KR targeted "particular ethnic minorities, religious leaders,
teachers, students, and other educated groups" for torture and subjected
them to "extra-judicial executions." 198
After its overthrow in 1979, the KR continued to fight the newly-estab-
lished People's Republic of Kampuchea in certain parts of Cambodia and
even retained enough power over sections of the country to obtain Cam-
bodia's seat in the United Nations.199 This struggle continued until the
1990s:
It was not until approximately 1993 that the Khmer Rouge ceased to
be an active fighting force. Since that time, many Khmer Rouge
members have returned to civilian life and now live freely in parts of
Cambodia. The Cambodian government has integrated other mem-
bers into the Cambodian national army and granted them immunity
from prosecution under a 1994 Cambodian law that criminalized
membership in the Khmer Rouge. 200
Although it seems that international attention to human rights in North
Korea is waxing rather than waning, sometimes it has been submerged
under important geopolitical and strategic concerns. In this way, the situ-
ation in North Korea is analogous to the Cambodian situation. "The de-
cades following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge (KR) were marked
by international apathy towards Cambodia, and the limited attention
given was concentrated on the establishment of a non-communist govern-
ment rather than the adjudication of potential crimes." 201 Indeed, "[o]nly
in 1997, after nearly two decades of relative inaction by the international
community on the matter, did the United Nations [ ] and the Royal Gov-
ernment of Cambodia [ I begin to discuss establishing a tribunal to try the
alleged perpetrators." 2 0 2 Regarding North Korea, much more attention
comes from the international community regarding its nuclear weapons
than the devastation already wrought through its extensive trampling
upon the human rights of its own people.
Returning to the Cambodia example, once order was established, both






201. Scott Luftglass, Note, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation's Responsibility
to Withdraw Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the
Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 901-02 (2004).
202. Kelly Whitley, History of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Origins, Negotiations, and
Establishment, in THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 29 (John D. Ciociari ed., 2006).
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respond to the overthrow of the KR.20 3 Unfortunately, the Cambodian
people did not derive a benefit from either of the responses, which only
produced more difficulties in bringing the former leaders of the Khmer
Rouge to justice. 204
Cambodia responded in 1979 with what is widely regarded as a farcical
trial of both Pol Pot, the former dictator, and leng Sary, the Standing
Committee Member and Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. 205
The two leaders were tried in absentia without the ability to present a
defense, found guilty of the commission of genocide, and sentenced to
death by a domestic tribunal.206
Many of the officers responsible for the KR atrocities were not and
could not be punished because they died before the establishment of a
proper tribunal, which emphasizes why a tribunal should be established
as soon as possible after the fall of the ancien regime.207 As urgent as a
tribunal for North Korea would be, it would not enhance the rule of law
to engage in a hypocritical breach of due process in trying Kim Jong-Un
and his top officials. Any such trial should be full and fair, with built-in
protections for the criminal defendants. Otherwise, it would stoop to the
sort of truncated mockery of a process that North Korea itself inflicts
upon its own people.
North Korea's judiciary, as a mere tool for the ruling regime, lacks po-
203. See id. at 30.
204. Id. at 31.
205. Luftglass, supra note 201, at 902; see also Whitley, supra note 202, at 31.
206. Id. These trials emerged as problematic and procedurally unfair:
The international community refuses to recognize these trials as legitimate
for several reasons. First, the two leaders were tried in absentia, a violation
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Sec-
ond, the Decree Law establishing the "People's Revolutionary Tribunal"
contained language denouncing the two defendants, functionally assuming
their guilt, a violation of the international norm of the "presumption of inno-
cence." Third, the definition of genocide used at the trial did not comport
with the internationally accepted definition, and it was crafted to virtually
ensure the guilt of the defendants. The definition of genocide included:
planned massacres of groups of innocent people; expulsion of inhabi-
tants of cities and villages in order to concentrate them and force them
to do hard labor in conditions leading to their physical and mental de-
struction; wiping out religion; [and] destroying political, cultural and so-
cial structures and family and social relations. On balance, the People's
Revolutionary Tribunal was neither normatively fair nor in conformity
with prevailing international law.
The international community was predominantly focused on ensuring
Cambodian territorial sovereignty and stability, at the expense of a thorough
and adequate investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the
atrocities. The U.N. was involved in the settlement agreements terminating
the Khmer Rouge leadership and establishing transitional Vietnamese
occupation.
Luftglass, supra note 201, at 902-03 (quoting GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA: DOCUMENTS FROM
THE TRIAL OF POL POT AND TENG SARY (Howard J. De Nike et al. eds., 2000)) (footnotes
omitted); see also ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 38.
207. Whitley, supra note 202, at 12-13.
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litical independence and strength.208 It certainly does not uphold human
rights. Similarly, "the weakened state of the Cambodian judiciary from
years of civil war and the international nature of the crimes to be prose-
cuted led the government to believe that international participation was
necessary to ensure that the trials met international standards of jus-
tice." 209 As in Cambodia, international participation would greatly en-
hance the chances that the gross, systematic violations of human rights in
North Korea will be addressed.
The description of the Cambodian human rights crisis may readily be
analogized with North Korea in its severity and gravity, as well as in the
lack of response by the international community. For example, the UN's
Human Rights Commission's Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities issued a report on human rights is-
sues in Cambodia in March 1979.210 The Sub-Commission labeled the
abuses that it recorded from the last four years as "'the most serious
[human rights violations] that had occurred anywhere in the world since
nazism,' concluding that they 'constituted nothing less than autogeno-
cide." 211 However, after the Vietnamese occupied Cambodia that same
year, the UN ended its efforts to investigate the widespread atrocities. 212
Even the International Conference on Kampuchea that met in 1981 in
New York soon after the report focused not on the human rights issues
but "almost entirely on the Vietnamese involvement." 2 13 Other facts
about the international community's reaction (or lack thereof) are even
more startling:
During the entire period of its rule the Khmer Rouge occupied the
Cambodian seat in the U.N., without even a single Western country
voting against its retention. Perhaps more alarmingly, no country
has invoked the Genocide Convention on behalf of the victims,
brought a claim against Cambodia before the International Court of
Justice, or extradited Khmer Rouge leaders for trial via universal
jurisdiction.214
On the other hand, the international community did "take a prominent
role in the multilateral Paris Peace Accords of 1991, which reinstituted
the Cambodian government's full independence from Vietnam," and "on
208. See, e.g., Goedde, supra note 43, at 1287. ("Creating an independent judiciary,
devolving power to the people, applying civil liberties fairly-these are all counterintuitive
processes in the Party-conscious hierarchy of North Korea.").
209. Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice, 41
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1013, 1033 (2009). The experts that assessed the human rights
abuses in Cambodia suggested a tribunal similar to the ICTR and ICTY because of the
various independency problems in local judiciary. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 39.
But after a Sen-staged coup, the Cambodian government rejected the assessment and
wanted instead to construct a hybrid tribunal. Id.
210. Luftglass, supra note 201, at 903.
211. Id. (quoting U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 35th Sess., 1510th mtg. at 7, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 1510 (1979)) (alteration in original).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 904.
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October 23, 1991, the Paris Conference on Cambodia signed a complex
set of settlement accords." 215 Surprisingly though, the mandate that orig-
inally established the conference did not even reference concepts like jus-
tice, human rights, or criminal tribunals.216 It appeared that Cambodian
sovereignty was a higher priority for the international community than
the blatant human rights issues, which were effectively cordoned off to
the side.217 "[T]he international community prioritized Cambodian sov-
ereignty and control, but would later need to undermine that control in
order to lobby for an international tribunal." 218 Unfortunately for many
Cambodians, the UN subsequently rejected both an international crimi-
nal tribunal and a possible case before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).219
The North Korean situation could run into future challenges involving
the international community akin to those experienced in Cambodia. To
help avoid similar complications, human rights redress should be high on
the agenda of any post-reunification powerbroker from the outset. If
such redress is allowed to take a back seat early in the process, it will
become that much more challenging for it to come to the foreground
later.
The international community's approach toward Cambodia, emphasiz-
ing the Cambodian government's duty to human rights treaties and stan-
dards, includes an attempt to find an indirect route by addressing the
human rights concerns in Articles 15 and 17 of the Paris Peace Ac-
cords.220 The approach contains implications that might apply to North
Korea:
Article 15 included several major human rights provisions: it
stated that all Cambodians shall enjoy the rights and freedoms enu-
merated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international instruments; it imposed on Cambodia an affirmative
duty to protect human rights and institute preventive measures to
ensure that the policies and practices of the Khmer Rouge era do not
return; in an effort to eliminate the international neglect that pre-
vailed during the Khmer Rouge era, Article 15 imposed correspond-
ing obligations on other signatories; and Article 17 imposed on the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights the obligation to monitor the
human rights conditions in Cambodia. Professor Ratner best charac-





219. Id. "Professor Steven R. Ratner, who represented the United States during the
negotiations at the Paris Conference, stated: 'Although all the participants believed that
human rights should be mentioned, it was harder to reach consensus on how to ... punish
Khmer Rouge officials responsible for the atrocities and to prevent the repetition of these
acts. As a result, the human rights obligations at times appear opaque."' Id. at 904-05
(quoting Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
25-26 (1993)).
220. Id. at 905.
2012] 797
SMU LAW REVIEW
obligating Cambodia to meet its commitments under the pertinent
human rights instruments, especially the Genocide Convention." 2 2 1
Given North Korea's ratification of a number of major human rights trea-
ties,222 we may similarly apply these treaties to North Korea. Simply
holding North Korea to its already-existing commitments to international
law can greatly help address the heinous crushing of its own people.
As in Cambodia, the international community has not paid sufficient
attention to North Korea's human rights situation, although the tide may
be turning in this regard. The experiences in Cambodia have taught the
international community that its neglect over several decades has de-
creased the international community's ability to influence present at-
tempts to create a tribunal. 223 Luftglass stated that:
As Cambodian scholar Brian D. Tittemore observed: "[T]he absence
of timely intervention by the international community to prevent or
punish Khmer Rouge atrocities significantly limited the United Na-
tion's present-day ability to influence the creation of a Khmer Rouge
tribunal or to ensure that any such tribunal is competent, impartial,
and effective." 224
Luftglass went on to emphasize that past neglect creates concerns that the
international community is not acting in the best interest of Cambodia,
and international action may end up doing more harm than good.2 2 5
As has been the case in Cambodia (by way of a negative lesson), the
sooner North Korea's human rights situation can receive greater atten-
tion and care from the international community the better. Delay dam-
ages the prospects of timely and effective intervention, similarly to how
delaying surgery in certain instances can harm a patient and damage the
prognosis.
What may be learned from the Cambodian experience for North Ko-
rea? First of all, the more aware and educated the international commu-
nity becomes about the grave human rights situation, the more support
there may be for an eventual tribunal. NGOs, international organiza-
tions, and concerned individuals would likely continue to play leading
roles in this regard, as the bulk of national governments are unlikely to
lead in such an effort.
A tribunal that would take place as soon as possible following reunifi-
cation would seem to be the most feasible approach. The ICC option, as
attractive as it appears in some regards, would likely face difficulty in
extraditing the newly appointed Kim Jong-Un, and such an attempt might
221. Id. (quoting Ratner, supra note 219, at 40) (alteration in original).
222. North Korea has signed onto both the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Tan, supra note 1, at
689.
223. Luftglass, supra note 201, at 905.
224. Id. at 905-06 (quoting Brian D. Tittemore, Securing Accountability for Gross Vio-
lations of Human Rights and the Implications of Non-Intervention: The Lessons of Cambo-
dia, 7 ILSA J. INr'L & COMP. L. 447, 451-52 (2002)) (alteration in original).
225. Id. at 906.
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provoke a war. However, extradition of the inexperienced and untested
Kim Jong-Un might prove much easier than it would have been to try to
extradite his late father, Kim Jong-Il. If domestic prosecution does not or
cannot provide satisfactory resolution, a hybrid tribunal appears to be the
best option. In such a tribunal, corruption must be avoided and bias must
be reduced as much as possible. In addition, the tribunal must communi-
cate well with the general public, and a sensible blend of domestic and
international resources should be utilized with an eye towards aiding the
domestic system long term. This Article now culminates in considering
the prospects of such a hybrid tribunal.
C. A HYBRID TRIBUNAL
1. Characteristics (Factors for Consideration)
a. Transitional Justice
A "third generation" of courts-hybrid courts-has emerged to ad-
dress the challenges faced by purely international or domestic tribu-
nals.2 2 6 Hybrid courts, which combine aspects of international and
domestic courts, attempt to increase legitimacy in pursuing justice and to
build the capacity of a renewed domestic system, while providing a work-
able and less expensive alternative to other less effective international
justice options. 227 Not only does the hybrid tribunal provide legitimacy,
which is crucial in itself, but a hybrid tribunal also provides expertise in
the form of international judges.228
Hybrid tribunals join international judges with local judges to apply
amalgamated procedures and law that incorporate intrinsic domestic val-
ues as well as established international norms.229 Local lawyers also work
alongside their international counterparts in the process.230 This hybrid-
ized tribunal acknowledges the importance of ideologically distancing the
criminal court process from the perceptions of impropriety inherent in
the local judicial system. 2 3 1 Similarly, the hybrid court engages local
stakeholders and incorporates them into the process. 232
Hybrid tribunals have risen in response to the view that "solution[s]
should be carefully tailored to the conflict and the needs and interests of
the parties through an inclusive design process" instead of the assumption
"that internationalized criminal courts are the best mechanism for resolv-
ing every dispute." 233 Hybrids are a recent innovation in international
226. Etelle Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National
Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 352-56 (2006).
227. Dermody, supra note 45, at 83.
228. Id. at 84-85.
229. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 490-91; see also ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15,
at 36 ("The legal basis of the SCSL and the ECC provided the governments much more
involvement and control over the final institution.").
230. Dermody, supra note 45, at 82.
231. See Monagham, supra note 130, at 511-14.
232. Higonnet, supra note 226, at 361-62.
233. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 116, at 4.
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justice, a next generation alternative that responds to specific criticisms of
its ad hoc international tribunal predecessors (i.e., the 1993 ICTY and the
1994 ICTR). 2 3 4 These criticisms include the courts' vast distance from the
countries in which violations took place, which disconnects the courts
from the populace. 235 The generally more proximate locations of hybrid
tribunals provide readier access to testimony and evidence. The ad hoc
tribunals have also received criticism for the slow pace of the trials and
the massive expense of trying even a handful of perpetrators. 2 3 6 In hy-
brids, by contrast, the dual goals of legitimacy and capacity building have
fewer obstacles towards accomplishing their goals while operating in a
more cost-effective manner.237 International participation in the prose-
cution also puts other dictators on notice that such egregious crimes
against humanity can be met with accountability. 238
In 2000, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 239 was created as
an autonomous court separate from the local court system through an
agreement with the UN.24 0 The SCSL coordinated its efforts with the
Sierra Leone Truth Commission. 2 4 1 International judges held a majority
against a minority of local judges in the tribunal.2 4 2 In 2003, the Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was formed
through protracted negotiations with the UN. 2 4 3 The ECCC differs from
the Special Court because it is part of the Cambodian court system, ap-
plies both Cambodian and international law, and consists of a narrow ma-
jority of local judges and a minority of international judges.2 4 4 In 2000,
East Timor and Kosovo tribunals were formed by domestic regulations,
which created panels of international and national judges. 24 5 In 2005, the
War Crimes Chamber (WCC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina was created as
a domestic institution functioning under national law.2 4 6 It was designed
to facilitate the ICTY's exit strategy by prosecuting cases that the tribunal
referred for adjudication.2 4 7 Such prior hybrid tribunals provide predi-
234. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 490-91.
235. Id. at 491. The tribunals were plagued with other issues as well. For example,
"[t]he ICTY's greatest difficulty early on was securing the apprehension of indictees," es-
pecially that of high ranking officials. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 24-25. The
ICTR experienced problems with the concurrent jurisdiction of the national court and the
international tribunal. Id. at 25-26.
236. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 490-91.
237. Higonnet, supra note 226, at 349.
238. Sterio, supra note 2, at 903-04.
239. There is a discussion of how the SCSL is better than its predecessors in Raub,
supra note 209, at 1037.
240. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 492.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 493.
243. Id.
244. Id.; ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 42-43. The court also maintains investi-
gating judges, co-prosecutors, and an expansive jurisdiction, but it still has had the problem
of finding and effectively prosecuting high ranking officials. Id.
245. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 493.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 493-94.
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cate examples for contemplating a hybrid tribunal for North Korea's
gross and systematic violations of human rights.
b. Advantages
Even with only a handful of modern hybrid attempts under our collec-
tive and figurative "belts," advantages to their employment appear to be
greater legitimacy with the participants than other options; capacity
building of the local legal systems; and infusion with international
norms.248 Experience also tends to show that these tribunals are quicker
to indict individuals and bring them to trial.2 4 9
Hybrids contemplate the concomitant goals of respecting sovereignty
while upholding universal standards, making it possible to prosecute
criminals domestically for violating universal norms.250 As a result, the
hybrid system represents the interests of all in the context of international
justice. 251
i. Legitimacy
Hybrid courts have the potential to claim a stronger overall basis of
legitimacy than the previous generations of either pure international or
domestic processes. 252 The tribunal team linking national and interna-
tional lawyers, judges, and other experts helps disarm challenges to legiti-
macy on grounds of imperialism or domestic biases.253 Collaboration
between international actors and regional partners further mitigates the
possible perception that developed powers are merely intervening to ex-
act some arbitrary form of revenge on dictators.254 Overall, involving the
local citizenry and its legal institutions may also increase the likelihood
that hybrid tribunals "will bring a greater sense of reconciliation." 2 5 5
Legitimacy concerns are a major hurdle for international judges in
transitional justice proceedings where marginalized groups have been vi-
olently oppressed by the dominant group. 2 5 6 A residual lack of faith in
legal processes may be borne into the post-conflict system, and special
attention is needed to "resolve prior imbalances and recalibrate the equi-
ties" so as to craft a solid foundation for the new legal system.257 A pro-
cess that is not perceived as legitimate tends to alienate the local
population and call into question the international community's commit-
248. Dermody, supra note 45, at 83.
249. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 93.
250. One advantage is that the hybrid tribunal is located in the locus delicti. Therefore,
"[t]hrough public stigmatization and just retribution, local trials are able to expose those
responsible for atrocities to the local population, leading to gradual reconciliation and a
cathartic process for victims." See Raub, supra note 209, at 1042.
251. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 491-92.
252. Dickinson, supra note 144, at 1064.
253. Id. at 1069-70.
254. Id. at 1069.
255. RoPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 93.
256. See Moghadam, supra note 130, at 513.
257. Id. at 513-14.
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ment to genuine justice.258 With respect to this factor in North Korea, it
would depend on what circumstances exist when the tribunal is created.
Pertinent factors would include whether Korea was unified or still di-
vided; whether the resources of South Korea would be available or un-
available due to wartime devastation or another reason; and whether
qualified and sufficiently unbiased personnel could be drawn from North
Korea (which, as demonstrated above, presently appears to be a dubious
possibility). 259
Presumably, less biased and more disinterested international judges
who consult with their local partners in joint decision-making processes
can do much to increase public belief in and acceptance of the results. 2 6 0
The result of judicial collaboration can be a standard of shared values
defined by the integrated international and regional partnership. 261
International judges benefit from their proximity to the local popula-
tion in hybrid models. The sensitivity to local issues, local culture, and
local approaches to justice is more readily accessible when making deci-
sions "on the ground" and in the conscious presence of the affected popu-
lation.262 The presence of these international actors may also enhance
perceptions of judicial independence that are especially important in
transitional nations which have a recent tradition of interference or overt
control over the judiciary.263 In North Korea, no politically independent
judiciary exists. 264 However, South Korea does have both judicial infra-
structure and personnel who can contribute. 265 National judges involved
in the process receive the benefit of training, exposure to norms of inter-
national law, and skills useful for the long-term capacity building of the
national judiciary for use at the termination of the tribunal's work.2 6 6
Similarly, international judges bring a level of impartiality in an envi-
ronment that risks being highly politicized.267 The inclusion of interna-
tional judges provides a layer of insulation against intimidation from local
judges' own governments or other interference with the rule of law. 2 6 8
When this hedge against improper interference is absent, the specter of
illegitimacy may manifest itself and obstruct the process in some way.2 6 9
258. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 94.
259. See generally supra Parts II.A.1. & II.A.2.
260. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 514.
261. Id. at 519-21.
262. "The incorporation of local perspectives through population surveys, studies of
traditions, and participation of moral authorities should increase the legitimacy of the
source from, and process through, which [hybrid courts] are created." Ramji-Nogales,
supra note 116, at 66.
263. See Moghadam, supra note 130, at 511.
264. Goedde, supra note 43, at 1287.
265. Id. at 1285.
266. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 491-92. Roper and Barria agree with Ramji-
Nogales in that hybrid tribunals have created greater educational and training programs
than international tribunals. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 93.
267. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 511.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 511-12.
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Moghadam gives this example: the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), a pure do-
mestic tribunal with foreign supervision, barred international judges from
participation and consequently lacked a sufficient level of quality in the
proceedings. 2 70 As a result, the trial of the ruthless Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein was widely viewed as "lacking in legitimacy and fairness,"
including vulnerability to political interference and government
manipulation. 271
However, one issue regarding international participation in Korea in-
volves language. If international personnel take part and the Korean
community is to perceive the proceedings as legitimate, the tribunal
would have to address the issue of language. Similar to tribunals in the
past, a Korean hybrid tribunal would have to utilize both Korean, the
native language of the peninsula, and English, the de facto international
language. Although this could be seen as a challenge to any Korean hy-
brid tribunal, successfully integrating both languages into the proceedings
would strengthen the institution's legitimacy and acceptance with the lo-
cal population.272 For example, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights utilizes both Spanish and English.273
Edmundo Hendler suggests that permitting a newly-awakened nation
access to the results of the judicial process is not a matter of simple inter-
est: "Apart from its socializing function through the education of the peo-
ple, there is the legitimating function that comes from the acceptance of
the law as a body of rules to be followed." 274 In fact, he continues, it is a
necessary first step for ensuring that the rule of law is adopted by a transi-
tional community or else it will supplant its own formal mechanisms of
justice-like an overflowing river pouring over its banks:
Societal opinion will always find a channel; it may be chaotic, as is
the case with lynching, assemblies cheering and hooting judges, or
street demonstrations calling for television broadcasts, or it may be
in the form of institutionalized answers, like juries, lay magistrates,
popular councils of advisers or any similar variation.. . . There is no
need to explain how uncontrollable the pressure of public opinion
can become in cases of spontaneous response like the one described
above.275
Community participation begins with community awareness. To culti-
vate community awareness, intervening actors must ensure the public has
access to recordings and court declarations of the proceedings. 2 7 6 Such
materials can then be broadcasted to the entire nation through the news
outlets. As a collection of records comes to light throughout the process,
270. Id.
271. Id. at 512.
272. Dermody, supra note 45, at 100-01.
273. INTER-AM. CT. H.R. RULES OF PROCEDURE art. 22 R.1-2.
274. Edmundo Hendler, Lay Participation in Argentina: Old History, Recent Experi-
ence, 15 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 18-19 (2008).
275. Id. at 4.
276. Dermody, supra note 45, at 80.
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the documentation of the previous regime's actions may help alleviate the
tension surrounding what may be thought of by some as international
intrusion and further justify the grounds for collaboration by local legal
experts.277
The diffusion of norms into societies afflicted by institutionalized atroc-
ities may be accomplished to an extent by integrating international stan-
dards of justice and human rights into domestic law. 2 7 8 This takes place
in the hybrid tribunal environment through uniformly applying just legal
principles in practice and by showcasing the interaction between elite ac-
tors throughout the process. 2 7 9 Judges, law experts, secretaries, police of-
ficers, local news outlets, and anyone from the community who has
contact with the hybrid court may adopt the normative values. This is
especially important when there is an opportunity for domestic or inter-
national interference in the national reconstruction process by individuals
or groups that supported the abuses of the previous regime. Individuals
who view the fruits of the tribunals first-hand can resist accusations of
impropriety and assist in the establishment of the post-regime judicial
system.
ii. Capacity Building
National institutions in post-conflict countries are often physically de-
stroyed through years of civil warfare and political neglect or through
judicial corruption and intervention by the former regimes. 2 8 0 The judi-
cial systems themselves may lack physical infrastructure, competent per-
sonnel, and public confidence. Entire groups may have been denied
access to education or professional choice under the old regime. 2 8 1 "In
the wake of mass violence, there may be very few trustworthy leaders left
in the afflicted society, not to mention the society's physical infrastruc-
ture, which may have been completely destroyed." 282 Sharing the re-
sponsibilities of administration of justice between local and international
actors is one way of establishing the legitimacy of the judicial process
while simultaneously strengthening the domestic capacity for administer-
ing justice in a post-regime environment.283
The hybrid judicial process allows society to transition toward stability
and security in the new system, while acknowledging the atrocities com-
mitted by the former regime. 2 84 It has also been characterized as a tool
to rebuild domestic judicial systems by providing judicial training for
these systems, while serving as an institution of justice. 285 There are in-
277. Id. at 80-81.
278. Id. at 100.
279. Id.
280. See Moghadam, supra note 130, at 521-25.
281. Id.
282. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 116, at 67.
283. Dickinson, supra note 144, at 1068-69.
284. Dermody, supra note 45, at 80-81.
285. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 93.
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stances when local judiciaries may be ready, willing, and potentially able
to prosecute atrocities, namely: when the local judicial institution is still
active and the country is willing to prosecute; when the offender occupied
a lower status in the perpetration hierarchy; or when lesser offenses were
committed. The ICC explicitly incorporates a spirit of "complementar-
ity" into its own statute, accepting that member states may receive juris-
diction to prosecute criminal cases on their own. 2 8 6 Reasons for this
include the fact that international tribunals require a large amount of re-
sources and veteran judges to try individuals higher up on the chain of
command who are more directly responsible for causing atrocities.287
[I]t is important to let national courts prosecute lesser offenders.
National jurisdictions, especially in war-torn countries, have to grow,
so that allowing them to prosecute offenders of important crimes
might help them rebuild their criminal codes and their judiciary.
Prosecutions might also be necessary as part of the country's healing
process, and prosecutions in the country that suffered a civil war are
going to be a lot more effective than ICC prosecutions taking place
at [T]he Hague . . . [T]he advantages of prosecution in the home
country include: the proximity of the evidence and the witnesses; the
judges' awareness of the nature of the conflict that occurred; the gov-
ernment's cooperation; as well as the fact that such national prosecu-
tions might be part of the home country's healing process. 2 8 8
A hybrid tribunal for North Korea can try the most responsible defend-
ants, leaving the prosecution of those less responsible to the reconstituted
domestic system.
The effectiveness of norm diffusion also depends on the availability of
a legal system that is willing to accept international norms. 289 While
tribunals may play a part in holding accountable those who grossly violate
and abuse their citizenry, international standards and practices alone may
not be enough to overcome normative beliefs cultivated throughout de-
cades of brutal oppression and propaganda, such as in North Korea. 290
Regardless, Professor Moghadam posits that the hybrid methodology
can be adapted for any state.291 He states that hybrid tribunals help en-
hance the interpretation of national law by helping it to conform to inter-
national standards. 292 This assumes of course that the international
standards would actually be an improvement over the domestic ones-a
likely scenario in the context of gross, systematic violations of human
rights as in the DPRK.
Hybrid tribunals also have the effect of strengthening the network of
normative accountability across domestic and international borders. 293
286. Sterio, supra note 2, at 903-04.
287. Id. at 904.
288. Id.
289. Dermody, supra note 45, at 100-01.
290. Id.
291. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 523.




Fair conduct of tribunals can also demonstrate the principle of uniform
application of law that is reasonably independent from political intru-
sion.2 9 4 This role plays a large part in regenerating faith in legal institu-
tions, which were previously tools of oppression.295 Other scholars have
also indicated the positive impact hybrids can have on building regional
capacities that reinforce international norms and local traditions.296 Each
of these benefits would immensely benefit a society such as North Korea,
which has suffered too long from pernicious injustice.
iii. Flexibility
The complexity of post-regime systems requires a flexible approach to
rebuilding that seeks to repair the nation.297 Flexibility is a keystone of
the hybrid model, as evidenced by the varying approaches and contexts in
which hybrids have previously been employed. 298 The system must be
tailored to meet the needs and particularities of each participating soci-
ety.2 9 9 While such flexibility can constitute a major advantage of hybrid
tribunals, it requires careful analysis and application to the local circum-
stances that emerge. The specifics regarding North Korea must be con-
sidered during the creation of the tribunal, rather than utilizing a cookie-
cutter hybrid mold which stuffs the Korean scenario into its pre-existing
dimensions. Many of these specifics will have to be analyzed at the time
when a hybrid tribunal is being established.
iv. Cost
Ad hoc tribunals have proven costly to administer.300 The hybrid
courts implemented in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone function as
less expensive alternatives. 301 Simply put, hybrid tribunals usually have a
lower economic cost.3 0 2 Promoting speedier case resolution not only di-
minishes financial costs, it lowers the psychological costs that people pay
when they must wait years for slowly-emerging verdicts.303
Although hybrid tribunals are less expensive to operate relative to
294. Id. at 524.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 521-25.
297. Dermody, supra note 45, at 102.
298. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 492-94.
299. Id. at 492.
300. Dermody, supra note 45, at 82.
301. Id. This may be partly attributed to the fact that many countries that maintain
hybrid tribunals, like Cambodia, also contribute to their operating and other costs. RoPER
& BARRIA, supra note 15, at 40; see also id. at 61-62 (stating that "the evidence is clear that
for some states, the creation of hybrid tribunals and the termination of Chapter VII tribu-
nals is a cost saving measure" and presenting tables with contribution amounts for each
tribunal).
302. Raub, supra note 209, at 1045.
303. Richard Lempert, Citizen Participation in Judicial Decision Making: Juries, Lay
Judges and Japan, 2001 ST. LoUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIc L.J. 1, 7 (2001-2002).
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their ad hoc predecessors,304 the cost of running a potentially multi-year
judicial proceeding requires continued support from international ac-
tors.3 0 5 Where this income is unsustainable, the ability of the court to
produce uniform justice and accountability may dwindle. 3 0 6 The result is
a decrease in legitimacy, capacity building, and norm diffusion.3 07
The Special Court of Sierra Leone ran decreasing budgets as the pro-
ject went on. Fiscal year 2003-2004 had $34 million, and 2004-2005 had
$29.9 million.308 At the time, experts recognized the decreasing funds as
a natural function of the process and projected the amounts to further
decrease to $25.5 million in the following fiscal cycle. 3 0 9
D. CHALLENGES
On paper, it sounds simple enough to combine the expertise of the in-
ternational actors with the legitimacy of the local community but, unsur-
prisingly, the devil is in the details. Hybrid tribunals, at their worst, run
the risk of unleashing the disadvantages of both worlds with the external
interference of international actors and the weakness of local institutions
that facilitated the atrocities to begin with.310 Another challenge is that
hybrid tribunals need to establish a body of both substantive and proce-
dural law.31 1
Conflict and tension between the old political, economic, and ethnic
systems and the new ones will likely persist despite any success by the
tribunal.312 Long-term commitment of investment and political capital is
critical to prevent backsliding.313 Fatigue and the resulting erosion in
commitment can contribute to deterioration of the nascent, reformed do-
mestic system.
Despite the choice of a hybrid tribunal, problems may persist. Witness
protection; evidence gathering; persistent bias in local judges; lack of
training; uncooperative national government entities; coercion or corrup-
tion through bribery or other means; perceptions of victor's justice
against "heroes" of the nation; and the visible discrepancy between the
treatment of perpetrators of atrocities who are held in air-conditioned
buildings and receive better food and medical treatment than the local
population may all be challenges to achieving the desired goals of transi-
304. Hybrid tribunals located in the locus delicti provide proximity to witnesses and
immediate access to evidence, which could reduce the cost. See Raub, supra note 209, at
1042.
305. Dermody, supra note 45, at 92.
306. See id. at 92-93.
307. Id. at 83.
308. Id. at 92.
309. See id. at 92-93.
310. Id. at 82.
311. Raub, supra note 209, at 1044.
312. Dermody, supra note 45, at 102.




Transitional justice through a hybrid court is inherently complex and
difficult. No amount of expertise, effort, and good intentions in the
courtroom can ultimately resolve all the difficulties facing the injured
populace. We must remember that there is no one model that fits all, and
consideration must be given to the rule of law in a particular "state as
well as the sincerity of the government in creating a free and fair pro-
cess."315 The best that a model can seek to do is craft the most effective
approach at mitigating and providing redress for the damage done by the
atrocities. 316 The hybrid model offers one mechanism for boosting local
legal development, but the process of holding atrocity perpetrators ac-
countable and incorporating domestic experts may not be enough to ex-
pect the post-regime legal system to take flight on its own. Other
mechanisms will be necessary to effect a reconstruction of the legal sys-
tem. A lack of time and sustained resources may even limit the ability of
hybrids to assist in domestic legal development. 317 Personnel and infra-
structure difficulties in East Timor and Kosovo and funding and delay in
Sierra Leone are just a few examples of this phenomenon. 318 "A lack of
commitment by the international community has stymied the process of
providing justice" 319 in many of these cases.
Certainly, transitional nations lacking basic public infrastructure, eco-
nomic venues, political mechanisms, and medicine320 would also benefit
from international assistance in their own right and by the appropriate
contributing agency, but that is not the role of a legal accountability sys-
tem. However, without these other necessary institutions and an estab-
lished legal culture to support a "rule of law," hybrid tribunals are even
more difficult to use successfully. 321
Milena Sterio argues that educational programs for local judges
through training by international experts, learning tools, and logistical
help to conflict-stricken nations can serve as alternatives to the creation
of hybrid tribunals: "[I]nstead of creating a hybrid tribunal with western
judges and 'international' statutes, developed countries can help set up
purely domestic tribunals, that would function under international super-
314. Sterio, supra note 2, at 897-98. Because most hybrid tribunals are not established
under the authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, jurisdiction over many defendants
is another problem. See ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 93-94.
315. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 94.
316. See Dermody, supra note 45, at 100.
317. Id.; see also ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 94.
318. Dermody, supra note 45, at 83. For example, the Serious Crimes Panel for East
Timor had a collection of personnel and logistical problems that led to questions of legiti-
macy and impartiality, including a shortage of court personnel, management inefficiency
leading to longer trials, inexperienced judges, immense language barriers, and the inability
to retrieve defendants from Indonesia. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 55.
319. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 94.
320. See Sterio, supra note 2, at 902.
321. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 15, at 93. Cambodia is the perfect example of this
problem considering that the rule of law is being addressed in part by the former perpetra-
tors under the old Khmer Rouge regime. Id.
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vision and that would possibly report to an international organ." 322
Sterio's suggestion, however, need not be taken as a necessary dichot-
omy. In other words, it is possible to have a hybrid tribunal together with
training and logistical help.
Sterio also mentions the UN judicial panels set up in Kosovo to try war
criminals and suggests that the mixed panel may be a starting point for
Kosovar capacity building.323 Eventually, the international judges would
not be needed once the local judges receive field training and educa-
tion.3 2 4 Sterio is correct in pointing out that international judges will not
be needed for a hybrid criminal tribunal indefinitely. As a model for lo-
cal judges steering the helm of a domestic criminal tribunal, local authori-
ties in Croatia report to the ICTY prosecutor per Rule 11bis of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 325 To the extent matters may be tilted
toward the domestic side of the spectrum without unduly sacrificing im-
portant objectives, such an approach has potential advantages in terms of
domestic ownership, longer-term sustainability, and cost.
Yet Tanaz Moghadam maintains that the very presence of the interna-
tional judges with experience working in tandem with domestic judges in
applying international standards serves as a better approach by demon-
strating the efficacy of "reviving faith in rule of law" where such consis-
tency has been the exception, not the norm.32 6 In a place that does not
have rule of law such as North Korea, a revival of faith in, and the actual
practice of, the rule of law are precious purposes indeed.
E. FRAMEWORK FOR A NORTH KOREAN
CRIMINAL HYBRID TRIBUNAL
The precise contours of what would constitute the most legitimate hy-
brid tribunal would depend on the context from which it emerges. If it
emerges on the heels of a war, then legitimacy would be burnished by the
participation of international judges and prosecutors from nations other
than the victorious powers.327 Otherwise, the stench of "victor's justice"
could vitiate the process. 328 Such a tribunal would be more likely to be
the subject of the attack that it is merely a vindictive instrument rather
than a means of attaining a greater measure of justice. It would be more
vulnerable to the claim of being an imposed, imperialistic institution
rather than an aid to the emerging domestic system. These caveats do not
imply that there may not be any participation from those on the victori-
ous side, but that such participation, if it exists, should be mingled with
322. Sterio, supra note 2, at 901-02.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 891-92 (citing INT'L GRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA R. P. &
EVID. R. llbis).
326. Moghadam, supra note 130, at 521-25.
327. See generally supra Part II.A.1.b.; see also supra Part II.C.1.b.i.
328. See generally William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535 (2010).
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participation from those who might be considered less biased, more im-
partial, and therefore more legitimate.
If such a tribunal emerges after a peaceful reunification, the aforemen-
tioned issues would be less pronounced. 329 However, the concern exists
that the possibility of such a tribunal might be taken as a perverse incen-
tive for those in North Korea not to relinquish power peacefully and to
fight to the bitter end. Such diplomatic concerns must be handled with
great sensitivity and skill. At the same time, these concerns should not
entirely overshadow the overwhelming call for justice in light of the hor-
rific violations of human rights.
The local people and many of the opposing parties which survive the
collapse of the previous regime may "suddenly find themselves in a war
zone" of conflicting and confusing ideologies. 330 International actors
seeking to inject themselves into the judicial process may be seen as the
natural outlet for the expression of turmoil and frustration by the domes-
tic population.331 Indeed, the weight of domestic North Korean ideology
is geared toward rejecting the validity of other nationals, with the partial
exception of their sibling state South Korea, which North Korean propa-
ganda claims is under the imperialistic yoke of the United States.332 For
this reason, South Koreans must play a genuine role in the hybrid tribunal
or it runs the risk of its delegitimization as a tool of "foreign devils."
Recognizing the critical fusion of domestic and international elements,
it is thus conceivable that at some point in the process a hybrid tribunal
could be structured to slowly merge with a domestic tribunal at the
achievement of a series of pre-conceived milestones in the criminal trials.
A former Sierra Leonean prosecutor suggests that the ideal length of a
hybrid tribunal is five years.333 In that way, a majority of international
judges can be gradually replaced by a majority of domestic judges as judi-
cial capacity is built on the ground. 334 These characteristics begin to out-
line a potential timeline around which to build this framework.
As the availability of skilled North Korean judges eventually grows out
of the partnership between South Korean and international judges, a hy-
brid tribunal may serve to pool judicial development resources while si-
multaneously trying the criminals who destroyed or neglected this
capacity to begin with. A well-calibrated hybrid tribunal may make ma-
jor progress in bringing a greater respect for human rights, and justice for
329. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
330. Dermody, supra note 45, at 88.
331. Id.
332. See Tan, supra note 26, at 543-46.
333. Dermody, supra note 45, at 92.
334. However, the international community must be wary in leaving such matters solely
to domestic judges. For example, the Indonesian Human Rights Courts appointed both
career and ad hoc judges (typically highly inexperienced lawyers) that contributed greatly
to a lack of convictions, a flawed appeals process, a lack of professionalism in the judiciary,
incompetent prosecutors, and a lack of coordination and political will overall. ROPER &
BARRIA, supra note 15, at 54, 56-58.
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those who have suffered egregiously at the hands of the North Korean
government.
III. CONCLUSION
Building off a prior companion publication,335 this Article offers a pos-
sible means to address the egregious lack of respect for basic human
rights of North Korea: a hybrid tribunal that would ideally combine the
strengths of a domestic court with the contributions of an international
court to enhance legitimacy, build domestic capacity, reduce costs, and
help bring a measure of justice. Such a court must carefully contextualize
itself to the particulars of Korea and avoid the pitfalls of imperialism,
corruption, and bias.
Such a hybrid tribunal can also contribute momentum towards the
eventual formation of an Asian system of human rights.336 Drawing from
the lessons of already-existing regional systems of human rights in Eu-
rope, the Americas, and Africa, such a system could serve as a more per-
manent bulwark to fortify respect for human rights in Asia.33 7 It could in
time obviate the need for the sorts of hybrid tribunals discussed herein.
Until there is an establishment of such a system of human rights for the
most populous continent in the world, a hybrid tribunal can serve as a
stopgap measure to address the hemorrhaging in places such as North
Korea. The unspeakable suffering of so many under Pyongyang's steel
boot should not be met with passive indifference. Whether through the
ICC, domestic prosecution, or a hybrid tribunal, impunity and oppression
should not be allowed to reign unchecked. The healing of the Hermit
Kingdom, the stability of the region, and the sizable ramifications that
affect our deeply interconnected world all hang in the balance. If a threat
to justice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere (with due credit to
Martin Luther King, Jr.), this state of rightlessness, this egregious case of
gross, systematic violations of human rights in North Korea, simply de-
mands redress. A hybrid tribunal may provide the best path forward.
335. See generally Tan, supra note 1, at 683, 708.
336. One effort may well be under way with the formation of the Asian Human Rights
Commission. For a discussion on the Commission and its potential future problems, see
Bina D'Costa, Challenges for an Independent Asian Human Rights Commission, 4 ILSA J
INT'L & Comp. L. 615 (1998). See also Asian Human Rights Charter-Draft Document,
ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., http://material.ahrchk.net/charter/mainfile.php/draftchar-
ter/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
337. For a general discussion on the human rights systems in Europe, Africa, and espe-
cially the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, see Richard J. Wilson, Researching
the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Litigator's Per-
spective, AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
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